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INTRODUCTION
Laura Lale Kabis-Kechrid
Despite the progress Tunisia has made in the past 
years, the country continues to be plagued by the 
persistence of grave socio-economic disparities – a 
key driver of the popular upheavals in 2011. Among 
other factors, corruption and the high frequency of 
changes in government have significantly hampered 
the Tunisian government’s ability to address these 
issues and implement effective socio-economic and 
political reforms. As a result, dissatisfaction with 
the political process has been growing, particularly 
among youth. This has provided a fertile ground for 
radicalization. Radical groups have been gaining a 
stronger foothold among politically and socio-eco-
nomically marginalized groups in Tunisia. The 
assassination of political figures Chokri Belaid and 
Mohamed Brahmi in 2013, several deadly terrorist 
attacks, as well as the high number of Tunisian for-
eign fighters who have traveled to Syria, Libya, and 
Iraq, have shaken the country in its core. 
To tackle the problem of radicalization and to regain 
public trust in the democratic process in Tunisia, a 
holistic approach is needed that includes the reform 
of the security sector, a stronger focus on preventive 
and deradicalization measures, improving employ-
ment opportunities for young Tunisians, and greater 
political participation. To ensure the stability of the 
country and the success of its democratic transition 
process, continued international support, especially 
from the EU and its member states, is crucial. 
This edited volume brings together papers written 
by the participants in the workshop series “Promo-
tion of Think Tank Work on Security Sector Reform 
and Socio-Economic Challenges in Tunisia”, held in 
Berlin in August and in Tunis in October 2017. The 
workshops were conducted as part of DGAP’s project 
on strengthening think tanks and similar institutions 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
and Europe. The authors analyze key issues impact-
ing the political, social, and economic development 
of  Tunisia, including the reform of administrative 
structures and the security sector, drivers of radical-
ization, and persisting socio-economic issues, espe-
cially in Tunisia’s historically marginalized regions. 
The volume offers recommendations for the  Tunisian 
government as well as for the EU and its member 
states, who are key partners in supporting the coun-
try’s reform process. 
Among the recommendations are the following: to 
safeguard the success of Tunisia’s decentralization 
process, which is fundamental for the sustainability 
of the country’s democratic transition, legislative 
reform must be driven by a coherent vision under-
pinning the restructuring of the state. In addition, 
the Tunisian government should implement partic-
ipatory mechanisms to communicate the need for 
progressive decentralization. 
In order to ensure that the Tunisian state can ade-
quately respond to the security challenges it is fac-
ing, while also ensuring that old structures of the 
security apparatus do not operate counter to the 
country’s democratization efforts, Tunisia needs a 
transformation of its security culture. To this end, the 
Tunisian government should provide an institutional 
framework that facilitates the integration of secu-
rity forces’ demands and a national security debate 
within a democratic setting. In the interest of ensur-
ing the sustainability of the country’s security sec-
tor reform efforts, the EU should create a framework 
that can bring together all European security coop-
eration initiatives with Tunisia, thus avoiding issues 
caused by bilateral, non-aligned activities. Moreover, 
the Tunisian government should revise the legal and 
structural framework of its anti-cybercrime efforts 
to overcome the current problem of fragmentation. 
The development of alternative funding models could 
also help the government become more self-reliant 
and gradually decrease the share of funding by inter-
national donors. In addition to reforming its security 
sector, an adjustment of current deradicalization and 
prevention approaches is advocated for. This includes 
close cooperation with civil society organizations in 
the state’s effort to counter extremist narratives and 
the strengthening of the Alternative Narrative Plat-
form (ANP) through the establishment of strategic 
units that would support the ANP’s ability to function 
as a self-sufficient unit. Moreover, more attention 
should be paid to the role social and family ties can 
play in preventing and countering extremism. 
With regard to the country’s socio-economic chal-
lenges, which frequently also constitute a driver 
of radicalization, the authors focus on two key 
aspects: first, to improve the employability of young 
 Tunisians, the Tunisian government should make 
sure that it adopts a student-centered approach that 
focuses on quality learning adapted to labor market 
needs when devising its reform plan for higher edu-
cation. Second, as precarious socio-economic condi-
tions have driven an increasing number of women to 
engage in informal cross-border trading, and in the 
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absence of sustainable government solutions to their 
marginalization, Tunisian policymakers should devise 
strategies for alternative sources of income for these 
women, activate free trade zones, and place female 
traders at the heart of the government’s war against 
corruption. 
The Contributions in Short
Chapter I: Administrative Structures and Security 
Sector Reform
“Tunisia’s Security Sector Since 2011 – Promoting 
International Cooperation”: Onur Kara assesses vari-
ous factors that have impeded efforts by the Tunisian 
state to reform its security sector in the aftermath 
of the ousting of former President Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali, and urges the Tunisian government to cre-
ate an environment that allows for a national secu-
rity debate within a democratic setting and gives 
members of the security services the opportunity to 
express their demands. In addition, the EU should 
ensure the sustainability of Tunisia’s reform pro-
gram by streamlining European security cooperation 
efforts. 
“Cybercrime in Tunisia – Tackling Legal, Structural, 
and Financial Challenges”: Alexandra Laban argues 
that the current structure in place to tackle cyber 
insecurities in Tunisia impedes the government’s 
ability to adequately respond to the sharp increase 
of cybercrime in the country. Therefore, policymak-
ers should revise the legal, structural, and financial 
parameters underpinning the Tunisian cyber-frame-
work to improve cyber security. 
“Reconfiguring Territorial State Administration and 
Decentralization in Tunisia – The ‘Obvious’ Need for 
a Political Vision”: Meriem Guetat critically assesses 
Tunisia’s ongoing decentralization process. She 
underlines the need for a coherent vision, reflected 
in clear legislative provisions, and the use of partic-
ipatory mechanisms that would allow the state to 
communicate the need for progressive decentraliza-
tion.
Chapter II: (De-)Radicalization
“Civil Society and Government Partnership in Pre-
venting Violent Extremism in Tunisia”: Sadem  Jebali 
analyses the Tunisian government’s strategy to 
counter the narratives of extremist groups by tak-
ing a close look at the government’s flagship initia-
tive – the Alternative Narrative Platform (ANP). He 
advocates for an improved partnership framework 
between the government and civil society organi-
zations and the establishment of strategic units that 
would improve the effectivity and self-sufficiency of 
the ANP. 
“Deradicalization and the Prevention of Radicaliza-
tion of Tunisian Youth through Peer Pressure, Family, 
and Tribal Bonds”: Samah Krichah draws attention to 
the importance of social ties in preventing radical-
ization as well as in deradicalization and reintegra-
tion efforts. Arguing that current strategies by the 
 Tunisian government do not sufficiently take the role 
of such ties into account, she advocates for a revi-
sion of current approaches and a greater involvement 
of family and peer networks in deradicalization and 
reintegration programs. 
“Ennahda and Hizb ut-Tahrir – Cooperative Rivals or 
Brothers-in-Arms?”: Inna Rudolf discusses the effect 
the positioning of the Ennahda party as “the cham-
pion of the post-revolutionary Islamist project” and 
“Muslim democrats” has had on the party and crit-
ically analyses its ambivalent relationship with the 
Tunisian branch of the international pan-Islamist 
Hizb ut-Tahrir party. 
Chapter III: Socio-Economic Challenges
“Tunisian Female Cross-Border Traders in Algeria – 
On Gender Transgression and Socio-Economic Mar-
ginalization”: Houda Mzioudet draws attention to 
the growing feminization of informal trade between 
Tunisia and Algeria. In light of women’s precari-
ous socio-economic situation and vulnerability to 
exploitation, she urges Tunisian policymakers to pro-
vide better support for female cross-border traders 
by drawing up strategies for alternative sources of 
income, activating free trade zones, and improving 
their safety and security at border crossings. 
“A Student-Centered Approach to Higher Education 
Reform in Tunisia”: Molka Abassi argues that the gov-
ernment’s recently approved reform plan for higher 
education focuses too much on governance, fidu-
ciary, and administrative changes, instead of adapting 
a student-centered approach, which she deems nec-
essary to improve graduate employability. She pre-
sents a broad range of recommendations that would 
allow the government to achieve quick gains in the 
areas of research and development and innovation, 
curriculum and pedagogy, and campus life and stu-
dent experience. 
Chapter I: Administrative 
Structures and Security 
Sector Reform 
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TUNISIA’S SECURITY SECTOR SINCE 
2011 – PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION
Onur Kara
The need to reform Tunisia’s security sector has been 
apparent since the immediate aftermath of President 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s departure in January 2011. 
The political transition that followed witnessed sev-
eral proposals for Security Sector Reform (SSR), and 
a sizeable literature on the subject has emerged. Nev-
ertheless, reform efforts have been impeded by endur-
ing political polarization, resistance from within the 
security bureaucracy, and the emergence of a security 
agenda dominated by counter-terrorism. Striking a 
balance between democracy and security in Tunisia 
requires a transformation of its security culture, which 
will play out chiefly at the domestic level. To this end, 
the Tunisian government should provide an environ-
ment for its security services to voice their demands, 
and the international community should ensure that 
Tunisia’s reform program remains sustainable over 
the long-term.
As the Arab Uprisings unfolded, political actors in the 
Arab world found themselves engaging with secu-
rity forces that were designed to protect the rul-
ing regimes in power rather than public security as 
defined in liberal democracies. The earlier logic of 
security had revolved around two objectives: protect-
ing the regime against its own population, and pro-
tecting the incumbent from intra-regime struggles.1 
Within this context, the collapse of a ruling regime 
meant that transitionary governments had to work 
with large yet inefficient security sectors. Tunisia’s 
transition, with security agencies being an indispens-
able part of Ben Ali’s regime, was no exception. While 
information regarding authoritarian security sectors 
is notoriously difficult to gather, recent research has 
established that such regimes utilized various incen-
tives to co-opt large segments of the population, in 
addition to repression.2 As well as housing a large, 
centralized security bureaucracy, Ben Ali’s regime 
also made use of local social relations to penetrate 
society further.3
1  Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge, 2012).
2  Probably the best example is Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime (Cambridge, 2012).
3  Beatrice Hibou, A Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia (London, 2011).
4  Joseph L. Derdzinski, Internal Security Services in Liberalizing States (Farnham, 2009).
5  Human Rights Watch, World Report 2017: Tunisia. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/tunisia> (accessed October 21, 2017).
6  Moncef Kartas, “On the Edge? Trafficking and Insecurity at the Tunisian-Libyan Border,” Working Paper 17, Small Arms Survey (December 2013) <http://
www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP17-Tunisia-On-the-Edge.pdf> (accessed October 21, 2017).
The democratic agenda which accompanied the 
Arab Uprisings advocated a different framework 
for thinking about security. In democracies, secu-
rity services are no longer committed to preserving 
a specific party or ruler – they abide by the rule of 
law and operate within a much more restrictive envi-
ronment.4 Reforming regime security-led practices 
within a democratic framework, however, is challeng-
ing. Persistent security threats make it very difficult 
to reconcile democratic values with security require-
ments, often eroding the former. Recent reports by 
humanitarian organizations have been increasingly 
critical of the Tunisian security forces, citing rights 
violations under the state of emergency rule in place 
since November 2015.5 Allegations include torture 
as well as the excessive use of force and arbitrary 
arrests, which in turn points to the risk of returning 
to authoritarian security practices.
The Internal Dimension of Security after 2011
The strength and structure of the Tunisian bureau-
cracy in general also reflects the country’s formative 
experiences. In terms of institutional development 
and effectiveness, Tunisia is one of the stronger 
states in the Southern Mediterranean: security provi-
sion is handled by statutory powers, and the country 
does not accommodate the militias that have become 
widespread in the Middle East. Furthermore, Tunisia 
does not have the same degree of ethnic and reli-
gious cleavages as its eastern Arab neighbors. These 
factors have contributed to the relatively low levels 
of armed violence in Tunisia, even after the influx of 
militants and weapons from the Libyan conflict.6
The institutional strength inherited from the pre-
vious regime has both positive and negative effects 
on SSR. Firstly, the absence of competing irregular 
armed actors means that SSR in Tunisia can func-
tion with well-defined and established actors, and a 
comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration Program may not be necessary. Nev-
ertheless, the presence of strong institutions with an 
authoritarian heritage can also create a substantial 
capacity and will to resist, or even manipulate efforts 
to reform them. The polarized political climate in 
Tunisia creates risks for foreign donors, as they may 
Chapter I: Administrative Structures and Security Sector Reform 
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become entangled in Tunisian domestic politics, as in 
the case of US military aid to Egypt.
It is crucial to recognize that Tunisia’s security sec-
tor is exceptional amongst its peers in terms of its 
structure. Unlike Egypt, the often-cited example, the 
regular army does not dominate the country’s secu-
rity sector. The Tunisian armed forces were kept at 
the margins of political life under Bourguiba and Ben 
Ali’s leadership, and were designed to be defensive 
forces smaller than the Algerian and Libyan armies. 
The army remains relatively small today, consisting 
of approximately 27,000 personnel, including con-
scripts. The country possesses a small navy and air 
force, although both have seen augmentation during 
recent years. Instead, it was the internal security 
apparatus, organized around the Ministry of Inte-
rior (MoI), which remained politically central. The 
MoI has been at the very center of the call for a SSR 
program in Tunisia, and control of this ministry has 
become one of the sensitive topics of the transition 
period. The National Guard, which takes the lead in 
defending domestic stability, numbers around 12,000 
personnel and operates under the MoI.
Designing a reform package for the MoI, however, 
has proven difficult. One example is the attempt to 
dissolve the Tunisian “political police,” which illus-
trates the problematic situation in which Tunisian 
decision-makers find themselves. The institution-
alization of coercive agencies under authoritarian 
regimes is often incomplete and obscure, and agen-
cies may have overlapping jurisdictions which pre-
vent them from forming a unified bloc. Mohammad 
 Ghannouchi’s government felt public pressure to dis-
band the political police in 2011. However, no “polit-
ical police” unit existed in the country. The govern-
ment, therefore, abolished the Direction Générale de 
7  Jean-Pierre Sereni, “Après Ben Ali, quelle police en Tunisie?” Le Monde diplomatique, April 1, 2011.
8  Jonathan N. C. Hill, Democratization in the Maghreb (Edinburgh, 2016).
9  Sharan Grewal, “A Quiet Revolution: The Tunisian Army After Ben Ali,” Regional Insight, Carnegie Middle East Center, February 24, 2016 <http://
carnegie-mec.org/2016/02/24/quiet-revolution-tunisian-military-after-ben-ali/iucy> (accessed October 21, 2017).
10  Ibid.
Sécurité du Territoire (DGST), a specialist unit within 
the MoI that was responsible for overall intelligence 
coordination as well as monitoring political figures.7 
While it is true that the DGST’s dissolution sent a 
strong signal, dismantling an important part of Ben 
Ali’s security apparatus, it also caused a substantial 
loss of security provision. When political violence 
ensued a year later, many DGST officials were rein-
stated.
While MoI reform is crucial for prospects of democ-
racy in Tunisia, it should be noted that the balance 
between the army and security forces within the 
security sector remains far from stable. The army’s 
relative marginalization from politics was primarily 
a result of coup-proofing practices under Bourguiba 
and Ben Ali, which stemmed from deep distrust. 
Tunisia traditionally allocates a smaller fraction of its 
budget to defense when compared to its neighbors. 
More importantly, previous regime practices meant 
that soldiers had little input in policymaking, even 
when security policy was concerned.8 This situation 
changed after 2011, when the army asserted itself as 
a key player in Tunisian domestic politics. In addi-
tion to a fast-expanding military budget, a number 
of military figures sought civilian positions, including 
seven military officers who were appointed as gov-
ernors.9
The threat of terrorism has also disrupted the inter-
nal balance of the security sector. The army became 
increasingly involved in counter-insurgency opera-
tions in the Chaambi Mountains in late 2012, which 
soon became a politicized issue when General Rachid 
Ammar was forced to retire.10 The Tunisian govern-
ment also boosted the defense budget as a response 
to recent challenges, and started procuring equip-
ment. In the last couple of years, Tunisia has pur-
chased helicopters from the US and armored vehi-
cles from Turkey, both of which were intended for 
counter-terrorism operations.
The imbalance between different factions within 
the security sector is problematic since it also 
exacerbates the polarization of civilian politics. For 
instance, when the Tunisian parliament passed a law 
granting suffrage to army regulars, it reinforced the 
Islamist-Secularist divide in Tunisian politics, as the 
Ennahda party tends not to support military suf-
Tunisia’s security sector is 
exceptional in the region in 
terms of structure
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frage, while senior figures from the secularist Nidaa 
Tounes party voted in favor. In addition, the emer-
gence of several anti-reform police unions in Tunisia 
has put further pressure on the government. Polar-
ization is very risky under these circumstances, as 
Tunisia is a case where formerly banned parties have 
now become major political actors, especially when 
Islamist politics are concerned. The politicization of 
security legislation can thus engender further dis-
trust in civil-military relations, preventing an effec-
tive response to security challenges.
Most of these cleavages also existed under the pre-
vious regime. However, the chief aim of the Tunisian 
presidency was to maintain inter-agency tensions 
rather than to solve them, keeping Carthage as the 
final arbitrator. Strong, personalized rule over the 
security sector no longer exists, and seems to have 
been replaced by party politics. High-level policy-
making regarding security affairs is fragmented and 
politicized, as both the president’s and the prime 
minister’s offices now have defense staff, and mul-
tiple centers of power are competing for influence 
over defense and security policies. In response, 
Tunisia’s National Security Council, which remained 
largely dormant since 1991, was re-activated, but it 
is yet to have the capacity to act as a fully functional 
coordinating agency.11 The current deadlock over 
security policy stems from the fact that although a 
democratic constitution has been passed, the bal-
ance of power between the presidency, the cabinet, 
and the assembly remains undetermined in Tunisia.
The External Dimension: Dependence on Security 
Cooperation
Although Tunisian policymakers were worried about 
the regional ambitions of Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya 
in the past, Tunisia has stayed out of military con-
frontations for most of its history. However, the 
country struggled to maintain its security after 2011, 
as transnational threats emanating from an unstable 
region blurred the line between domestic, regional, 
and international security.
Internal and external dimensions of security are 
closely interlinked in the case of the Tunisian secu-
rity sector. On the one hand, Tunisia’s domestic 
experience inspired others, influencing contentious 
11  International Crisis Group, “Jihadist Violence in Tunisia: The Urgent Need for a National Strategy,” Middle East & North Africa Briefing No. 50, June 22, 
2016 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/jihadist-violence-tunisia-urgent-need-national-strategy> (accessed 
October 21, 2017).
12  The World Bank, “Impact of the Libya Crisis on the Tunisian Economy,” Report No. ACS16340, February 2017 <http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/517981490766125612/p df/ACS16340-WP-P158090-PUBLIC-Impact-of-Libya-Crisis-on-the-Tunisian-Economy-Long-Version.pdf> (accessed 
October 21, 2017).
politics throughout the Middle East. On the other 
hand, Tunisian politics is much less isolated than 
before: the Libyan conflict remains a major concern 
for both the army and the security forces, causing 
the combined defense and security spending in Tuni-
sia to almost double since 2011.12 The high number 
of Tunisians who travelled to fight in Syria and Iraq 
presents another challenge. Within this context, 
security challenges cannot be adequately addressed 
via unilateral policies.
By relying on a security sector which favored the MoI, 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali effectively relied on diplo-
macy and alliances to protect Tunisia against exter-
nal threats. Successive Tunisian governments after 
2011 also recognized the importance of international 
cooperation. Although it is difficult to establish coop-
eration with Libya, Tunisia could foster coordination 
with the Algerian government to combat insurgents 
operating near the Tunisian-Algerian border. The US 
and UK have provided technical assistance to both 
the armed forces and the National Guard, and NATO 
has established an intelligence “fusion center” in 
cooperation with the local authorities.
As a result, Tunisia’s security sector now hosts a 
series of assistance programs rather than a single, 
centralized one. In addition to the challenges posed 
by liaising with multiple partners, this situation 
also creates dependence on foreign funds, creat-
ing financial risks to SSR. For example, when the US 
State Department’s draft budget for the 2018 fiscal 
year envisaged an almost seventy percent cut in aid 
programs to Tunisia, it threatened the sustainability 
of defense cooperation between the two countries. 
The situation was resolved after substantial debate 
Strong, personalized rule 
over the security sector is 
replaced by party politics 
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within the US legislature, and the intervention of 
Prime Minister Youssef Chahed.13
Recommendations
 - The Tunisian government should provide the insti-
tutional framework to integrate the security forces’ 
demands within a democratic setting
Signs of change in Tunisia’s security culture are 
already visible: civil society is active in the field of 
SSR, and retired officers now publish their opinions in 
the media. The government should capitalize on this 
environment of relative freedom and create alterna-
tive bodies that are detached from the polarization 
between political parties, or between the presidency 
and the government. This will allow a national secu-
rity debate to emerge within a democratic setting, 
and put pressure on anti-reform forces within the 
bureaucracy.
 - The international community should ensure the 
sustainability of security reform in Tunisia
Recent debates over US aid to Tunisia have shown 
that the stability of security cooperation is at stake. 
Since the Maghreb region lacks an effective regional 
mechanism to regulate security affairs, extra-re-
gional partnerships will remain crucial for maintain-
ing stability in Tunisia for the foreseeable future. In 
particular, the EU maintains a presence in Tunisia 
through its member states and supranational insti-
tutions, and also enjoys long-standing economic 
and political links, providing access to Tunisian 
policymakers. The EU should utilize its institutions 
and provide a framework within which all European 
security cooperation with Tunisia can be organized, 
relieving Tunisia from problems generated by bilat-
eral, non-synchronized SSR efforts.
Onur Kara is a PhD student at the Department 
of War Studies, King’s College London, UK. His 
research interests cover regional security in the 
Middle East, security studies in the developing 
world, and state-society relations in the Arab 
republics.
13  The proposed cuts would have reduced the aid budget to Tunisia from $165.4 million in 2017 to $54.5 million in 2018. See Byrant Harris, “House 
Rejects Trump’s Middle East Aid Cuts,” Al-Monitor, July 12, 2017. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/07/congress-override-trump-middle-
east-aid-cuts.html> (accessed October 21, 2017).
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CYBERCRIME IN TUNISIA – 
TACKLING LEGAL, STRUCTURAL, 
AND FINANCIAL CHALLENGES
Alexandra M. Y. Laban
The migration of crime to cyberspace has become an 
increasingly important policy challenge for Tuni-
sia. National authorities need to adapt their regu-
lations and organizational structures to face new 
threats that arise from the prevalence of internet in 
daily life. The sharp rise of cybercrime in Tunisia 
has rendered national law enforcement efforts obso-
lete in responding adequately to this unprecedented 
transnational challenge. Tunisia’s fight against cyber-
crime is a crucial item on the country’s current secu-
rity sector reform agenda and it is being hindered by 
existing legal, structural, and financial challenges. 
 Tunisian policymakers should strengthen the Tunisian 
cyber-framework to ensure a more secure cyberspace. 
This should include a coordinated initiative to collect 
relevant data, the revision of the legal and structural 
framework to overcome the current problem of frag-
mentation and move towards highly developed and 
coordinated organizational structures, awareness 
campaigns, and the development of alternative fund-
ing models, which can gradually replace international 
donors. 
Cyberspace has become a “criminal tool of unprece-
dented complexity and potential.”14 The United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) esti-
mates that almost 70 percent of all crimes will soon 
involve cyberspace to some extent.15 Moreover, 
cybercrime costs the global economy up to $445 bil-
lion annually, according to a report published by the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
and McAfee in 2014.16 As of 2015, malicious programs 
alone constituted the most significant threat to pri-
vate users, businesses, and administrations, as shown 
in Figure 1.17 The exponential rise in the number of 
malwares exemplifies the magnitude of a global phe-
14  Susan W. Brenner, Cybercrime and the Law: Challenges, Issues, and Outcomes (Lebanon, NH, 2012), p. 139.
15  Cho Seo-Young, “A Crime 2.0 – Cybercrime, e-Talent, and Institutions,” Macie Paper Series No. 2016 /4, Marburg Centre for Institutional Economics 
<https://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/paper_2016/08-2016_cho.pdf> (accessed October 21, 2017).
16  Daniel Dobrygowski, “Why Should We Care About Cyber Resilience? Because $445 Billion is at Stake,” World Economic Forum, September 8, 2016 
<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/09/why-should-we-care-about-cyber-resilience-because-445-billion-is-at-stake/> (accessed October 21, 2017).
17  German Federal Office for Information Security, “The State of IT Security in Germany 2016,” November 2016 <https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/
Downloads/EN/BSI/Publicatio ns/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2016.pdf?  blob=publicationFile&v=3> (accessed October 21, 2017).
18  Tunisia, CIA World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html> (accessed October 21, 2017).
19  Symantec, “Cyber Crime & Cyber Security Trends in Africa,“ November 2016 <https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/media/com_hsd/report/135/ 
document/Cyber-security-trends-report-Africa-en.pdf> (accessed June 13, 2017).
20  Malware is malicious software that attackers use to steal confidential information, destroy data, disrupt computer operations, or gain access to the 
compromised system’s network. Types of malware include viruses, worms, Trojans, and ransomware, and they spread through a variety of tools such as email, 
drive-by downloads, and infected files. They can also exploit existing vulnerabilities to infect systems.
nomenon and the rising threat of cybercrime for gov-
ernments.
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Criminal abuse of information technology and its 
necessary legal and governance responses have been 
discussed ever since the creation of cyberspace. Over 
the course of fifty years, cybercrime has remained 
challenging for two main reasons: constant technical 
developments and the rapidly evolving techniques for 
committing offenses. Although fighting cybercrime 
might not seem a top priority for Tunisia, it is, in fact, 
a crucial dimension of the Security Sector Reform 
(SSR) currently underway in the country. 
Tunisia ranks 65th out of 217 countries in internet 
users, reaching 5,355,000 internet users in 2014 and 
an internet penetration rate of 48.5 percent.18 With a 
growing number of citizens online, cybercrime has 
gained momentum. Specific cyber-attacks are preva-
lent in Tunisia. In fact, the country is among the top 
ten African countries for cyber incidents (32,187),19 
ranking second for spam and malware,20 and third for 
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bots.21 The most common cybercrimes in Tunisia are 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks,22 soft-
ware piracy, cyberlaundering, and cyber terrorism.23
National Policy Issues Arising from Cybercrime
Lack of Appropriate Data
It is worth noting that in its statistical criminal over-
view in Tunisia for 2014 and 2015, the Ministry of 
Interior (MoI) does not classify cybercrime as a crime. 
Cybercrime is a critical field that requires accurate 
information to attract the scrutiny and attention 
of Tunisian society. Lack of public information and 
knowledge about cybercrime only con tributes to its 
relative neglect in media coverage of SSR. Moreover, 
the absence of data to assess the extent of cyber-
crime creates a blind spot, which in turn renders 
policymakers powerless in accurately evaluating the 
threat at hand.
Legal Shortcomings
According to the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) Tunisia Cyberwellness profile (2014), sev-
eral legal measures regulate cybercrime in Tunisia. 
National legislation addressing cybercrime was intro-
duced into the Tunisian Penal Law (Article 199bis 
and 199ter) as early as August 2, 1999, and it focused 
mainly on intrusion into IT systems. On August 9, 
2000, Tunisia enacted a law regulating electronic 
commerce and electronic exchanges. In 2004, Law 
No. 2004-5 and its three related decrees recognized 
the need to further regulate cybercrime. In April 2017, 
a joint commission of representatives from the Min-
istry of Justice (MoJ) and the Ministry of Communica-
tion Technologies and Digital Economy (MoCT) met 
to draft a law on cybercrime. The first draft of a pro-
posed cybercrime bill was leaked to the public on July 
23, 2014. Two of its provisions alarmed civil society 
organizations, namely: surveillance and data gather-
ing in ongoing criminal investigations, and monitor-
ing of any online threat that could possibly jeopardize 
national security.
21  When used for malicious purposes, bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine to allow an attacker to remotely control the 
targeted system through a communication channel, such as internet relay chat (IRC), peer-to-peer (P2P), or HTTP (hypertext transfer protocol). These 
channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number of compromised computers over a single, reliable channel in a botnet, which can then be used 
to launch coordinated attacks.
22  Denial-of-service attacks are characterized by an explicit attempt to prevent users of a service from using that service. In a distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attack, the incoming traffic flooding the targeted website originates from many different sources.
23  Ahmed Ben Ayed, “Nature of Cyber Crimes and Legislation in the Republic of Tunisia,” International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer 
Engineering & Technology 6 (March 2017), pp. 241–44.
24  Patryk Pawlak, “A Wild Wild Web? Laws, Norms, Crime and Politics in Cyberspace,” EU Institute for Security Studies, July 2017 <https://www.iss.europa.
eu/content/wild-wild-web-law-norms-crime-and-politics-cyberspace> (accessed September 30, 2017).
Cyberspace brings to light the challenge of protect-
ing digital rights: access, freedom of connection, 
freedom of expression, equality, freedom of infor-
mation, privacy, and data protection. Concerns over 
how to strike a balance between safeguarding privacy 
and personal data, and ensuring national security 
have been raised in debates over the new cybercrime 
bill. The loose definition of privacy protection in the 
cybercrime bill could open the door to power abuses 
on the part of policymakers in the name of greater 
security. This issue has attracted the attention of the 
general public, and seems to have slowed the author-
ities’ efforts to update the country’s criminal legis-
lation.
The central challenge for the Tunisian legal system 
is to reform its Criminal Code. The gap between 
knowledge of new IT security breaches and neces-
sary criminal law adjustments functions as an addi-
tional impediment to Tunisian legislators. The latter 
problem remains all the more relevant as the speed 
of network innovation accelerates. Tunisia’s ratifica-
tion of the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-
crime, known as the Budapest Convention, conveys 
this challenge.
The Budapest Convention is currently the only 
legally binding instrument that provides a framework 
for international cooperation in the fight against 
cybercrime, and has served as a benchmark for set-
ting international standards in this field.24 Given the 
transnational nature of cybercrime, harmonization of 
national laws with international standards is vital in 
the fight against cybercrime. On September 23, 2015, 
Tunisia submitted its application to join the Budapest 
Convention. The pending ratification of the Buda-
pest Convention, due to delays in updating national 
cybercrime legislation, has impeded Tunisia’s adher-
ence to international legal best practices. 
Organizational Deficiencies in Addressing Cyber-
crime
Cybercrime is a multi-dimensional threat, which 
mobilizes a vast number of stakeholders to account 
for the many communication, security, legal, and 
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economic challenges that arise. Tunisia was a pio-
neer in Africa for building technical infrastructures 
to address cyber insecurity. Several governmental 
bodies and agencies coexist in the anti-cybercrime 
effort. Figure 2 categorizes the various Tunisian 
institutions and bodies involved in the fight against 
cybercrime.
As far as national security is concerned, the MoI is 
responsible for internal affairs such as cybercrime, 
and has newly recruited “Brigade 5,” which comprises 
thirty computer security engineers.25 In addition, a 
Tunisian Computer Emergency Response Team 
(tunCERT) was created in 2004 to provide proactive 
and reactive IT services, including information dis-
semination, tool development, network monitoring, 
auditing, penetration testing, and regulation devel-
opment. Initially, tunCERT was under the jurisdiction 
of another body: the National Agency for Computer 
Security (ANSI). Since 2004, ANSI has been the rec-
ognized body implementing a national cybersecu-
rity strategy, policy, and roadmap in Tunisia. It falls 
under the supervision of the MoCT, and is therefore 
not responsible for national security prerogatives. Its 
core missions are awareness-raising and technolog-
ical monitoring.
Regarding judicial investigations into cybercrime, the 
Technical Agency for Telecommunication (ATT), cre-
25  Chawki Gaddas, “Nécessité d’établir un cadre juridique en matière de cyber-sécurité en Tunisie,” Tekiano, June 3, 2017 <http://www.tekiano.
com/2017/04/27/chawki-gaddas-necessite-detablir-un-cadre-juridique-en-matiere-de-cyber-securite-en-tunisie/> (accessed October 21, 2017).
26  Wafa Dahmani, “Breaking the National Cyber Security Dilemma in Tunisia,” iGmena, June 15, 2017 <https://www.igmena.org/Breaking-the-National-
Cyber-Security-dilemma-in-Tunisia> (accessed October 21, 2017).
ated in 2013, is placed under the responsibility of the 
MoJ, and performs legal interceptions of suspicious 
online communication. Furthermore, ATT provides 
technical support in judicial investigations regarding 
the information systems of crimes.26
This divide in responsibilities between the MoCT, 
MoJ and MoI is contradictory, as cybercrime mostly 
remains a security issue. The fragmentation due to 
the high number of stakeholders in charge of complex 
investigations leads to structural confusion through 
overlapping responsibilities and unclear competen-
cies, as a wide range of expertise is required, from 
legal to technical aspects. As a result, the current 
Tunisian cyber-framework’s excessive need for 
coordination hampers the ability of policymakers to 
efficiently address the threat and meet the needs of 
their citizens.
Current Unsustainability of Financing the Fight 
against Cybercrime
Updating the cyber-framework comes at a high cost 
for Tunisia, especially in terms of analyzing what is 
already in place and which international best prac-
tices can be brought forward. International cooper-
ation instruments, such as that proposed by the EU, 
may represent a short-term strategy to fund the first 
steps in necessary anti-cybercrime reform. Support-
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ing SSR has increasingly become an area of engage-
ment for the EU to contribute to conflict prevention 
and peace-building. Ensuring effective SSR in neigh-
boring countries is critical to the long-term success 
of EU efforts to promote peace. One promising area 
for EU cooperation is to assist willing partner coun-
tries in implementing adequate anti-cybercrime 
reforms to reap the benefits of harmonized gover-
nance frameworks. The pillar of cybercrime diplo-
macy is that: “If all countries adopt adequate, consis-
tent cybercrime laws, transnational cybercrime will 
become easier to investigate.”27 In this context, the EU 
is committed to supporting Tunisia in reforming its 
existing security apparatus. For this purpose, the EU 
Commission Directorate General for Neighborhood 
and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) is fund-
ing a multi-million-Euro program in 2017 to support 
SSR in Tunisia, with a component on cybercrime and 
money laundering. This cooperation program is set 
to start in September 2017 within the Tunisian MoI.
International funding, however, is not a sustainable 
option in the medium- to long-term for national pol-
icymakers. In fact, heavy reliance on external donors 
will not help Tunisia become self-sufficient and con-
tinue its efforts after foreign donors have shifted 
their priorities.
Recommendations
 - Improve data collection as a stepping stone in 
weighing the extent of cybercrime
The lack of accessible data should be addressed to 
inform policymakers and the public on the mag-
nitude of the issue and to determine threat levels. 
Academics and politicians can use crime statistics 
as a basis for discussion and starting points for the 
decision-making process. Thus, the MoI should coor-
27  Brenner, Cybercrime and the Law (see note 14), p. 139.
28  M. Gercke, “Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries,” Cybercrime Legislation Resources, International Telecommunication Union, 
March 2011 <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3b71/8675198cf15c3167be8fbda20ed 227f78817.pdf?_ga=2.223590939.1675568018.1503152434-
1853178410.1502047837> (accessed August 20, 2017).
dinate a data collection initiative to include cyber-
crime in its crime statistical overview, especially as 
a data-sharing platform already exists on the minis-
try’s website. Publicizing the gathered information is 
vital to spark interest and build trust in the national 
cyber-infrastructures.
Furthermore, access to accurate information on the 
magnitude of cybercrime would enable  Tunisian 
law-enforcers to improve their anti-cybercrime 
strategy, deter potential attacks, and enact effective 
legislation. Proposed activities include expert review 
of key documentation, and cybercrime statistical 
data collection and sharing. By doing so, the Tunisian 
authorities will demonstrate the need for action and 
build momentum.
 - Revise the legal and structural cyber-framework
The rule of law (that is, a robust legal and organi-
zational framework) holds the most potential in the 
fight against cybercrime. The current cybercrime 
governance framework in Tunisia requires a com-
prehensive assessment, which should result in a 
publicly-accessible action document co-published 
by various high-level stakeholders (the MoI, MoJ, and 
MoCT, among others), providing the way forward to 
improving maturity. This action document should 
map the necessary steps to identify the main gaps 
in the required cyber capabilities, assess risk in the 
current threat landscape, formulate recommenda-
tions on national priorities, and establish a roadmap 
to reach the desired cyber-resilience capacities.
In addition, instead of creating a separate cybercrime 
code, cybercrime provisions should be included 
in the current Tunisian Criminal Code to simplify 
access to the law. To avoid drafting cybercrime leg-
islation unconnectedly, which may result in signifi-
cant duplication and wasted resources, legislators 
should monitor international standards and ensure 
the international harmonization of Tunisian criminal 
legal provisions.28 Last but not least, Tunisian crimi-
nal law can significantly benefit from the experience 
and training of other countries in order to modern-
ize the country’s judiciary. Tunisian policymakers 
need to review and update the current regulatory 
cyber-framework to guarantee the digital rights of 
Tunisian citizens while providing a secure and up-to-
Heavy reliance on inter-
national funding is not a 
sustainable option
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date internet, proactively equipped to face its secu-
rity dilemmas.
Rethinking the current fragmentation of the Tunisian 
cyber framework to focus on efficiency and align-
ment, to foster coordination, ensure accountability, 
and ultimately, increase organizational impact should 
be a priority for national policymakers. Fighting 
cybercrime entails highly developed and coordinated 
organizational structures and must balance central-
izing and devolving key responsibilities among the 
various stakeholders.
 - Foster inclusive participation and awareness of 
civil society
Educating internet users reduces the number of 
potential targets. One essential requirement of an 
effective training and information strategy is open 
communication and the inclusive participation of 
civil society. ANSI, which is the agency responsible 
for raising awareness about cybercrime in Tunisia, 
should widen its scope of action to encompass public 
campaigns, lessons in schools, libraries, IT centers, 
and universities, and public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) to engage Tunisian civil society.
 - Gradually replace international donors through 
alternative financing 
Tunisian policymakers, especially governmental 
bodies, must think strategically about resource man-
agement in reforming the cyber-framework. At a 
mature stage, an “Alternative Funding Model” or PPP 
arrangement could gradually replace international 
donors to ensure that the Tunisian authorities main-
tain their anti-cybercrime efforts. Thus, Tunisian 
companies will be relevant stakeholders in assisting 
their government in their relevant fields of expertise 
regarding cybercrime.
In parallel with governance efforts, Tunisian energy 
providers, water suppliers, transport companies, and 
other critical infrastructure providers must build 
solid expert networks to deliver secure and robust 
e-services as the enabling backbones of their busi-
nesses. Tunisian policymakers should commit to 
developing shared responsibilities through part-
nerships that seek to engage businesses especially 
in areas of critical infrastructure provision, and 
29  David M. Cook, “Mitigating Cyber-Threats through Public-Private Partnerships: Low Cost Governance with High-impact Returns,” School of Computer 
and Security Science, Edith Cowan University, 2010 <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a68f/55796f5a7186dc652805fd763a b99bbf916c.pdf?_
ga=2.260790667.723561613.1504092745-1853178410.1502047837> (accessed August 20, 2017).
to deliver a unified approach to cyber resilience in 
Tunisia. At the heart of this approach is the building 
of trust between government and private organiza-
tions.29
Alexandra Laban is a research analyst at Human 
Dynamics, an Austrian public affairs consulting 
company. She is part of the Francophone Practice 
within the Business Development Department 
and follows the security and rule of law portfolio.
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RECONFIGURING TERRITORIAL 
STATE ADMINISTRATION AND 
DECENTRALIZATION IN TUNISIA 
– THE “OBVIOUS” NEED FOR A 
POLITICAL VISION
Meriem Guetat
The 2014 Tunisian Constitution established a new 
mode of local governance based on the principle of 
decentralization. This was intended as a response to 
the deficiencies, including regional inequalities, of 
the previous system based on the 1959 Constitution. 
A reconfigured territorial administration could thus 
provide an opportunity to establish new political nar-
ratives based on identification with a new proximity to 
state institutions and invigorate political life. But for 
such an opportunity to become concrete, policymak-
ers must provide a coherent vision underpinning the 
restructuring of the state and translate it into legisla-
tive provisions. Furthermore, beyond the legal ratifica-
tion of decentralization, the state should communicate 
openly on the need for progressive decentralization by 
implementing participatory mechanisms.
The Tunisian Constitution of 2014 dedicated an entire 
chapter to specifying a new organization of local 
powers based on decentralization.30 The chapter 
addressed one of the most substantial problems that 
led to the 2010-2011 uprisings, namely the authori-
tarian mode of local administration and deepening 
regional economic disparities. Articles 131 to 142 of 
the new Constitution established principles such as 
free administration, participatory democracy, and 
subsidiarity.31 This new conceptualization of the role 
of local authorities marks a huge leap forward from 
the problems created by the 1959 Constitution and, if 
well implemented, indicates positive change.
As local authorities are now expected to provide 
local services, trigger regional and national eco-
nomic growth, and even respond to security issues, 
it seems that implementing the new principles of 
the 2014 Constitution is a matter of urgency. Yet the 
creation of concrete new legislative initiatives has 
been slow. While this new code is under discussion 
by the Parliamentary Committee on Administration 
30  Chapter VII of the Tunisian Constitution of January 26, 2014.
31  See Salwa Hamrouni and Salsabil Klibi, “Les défis juridiques et politiques à la mise en œuvre de la décentralisation,” Occasional Paper Series 17, Forum 
of Federations (2016), pp. 10-12.
32  See Youssef Cherif, “Tunisia’s Postcolonial Identity Crisis: A Key to Understanding the Lure of Extremism,” DGAPkompakt 23, German Council on Foreign 
Relations (2016) <https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/28906> (accessed August 6, 2017).
33  Author’s translation, Article 71, Tunisian Constitution of June 1, 1959.
34  Ibid., p. 178.
Organization and Armed Forces Affairs, it appears 
that the reconfiguration of relationships between the 
center and the regions determines not only the fate 
of the Tunisian transition, but more importantly, the 
reconstruction of a national identity that stems from 
a process of confidence-building and identification 
with state institutions.32
The Tunisian Territorial Administration Model 
before 2011
The 1959 Tunisian Constitution dedicated only one 
article to local authorities. Article 71 stated that 
“municipal councils, regional councils, and struc-
tures to which the law confers the statute of local 
authorities conduct their local affairs with respect 
to the conditions provided by the law.”33 This allowed 
legislative powers broad prerogatives to define how 
territorial administration functioned according to 
a political vision based on full territorial control. In 
effect, a combination of the rules laid down in the 
Organic Law No. 75-33 of May 14, 1975 on communes, 
and the Organic Law No. 89-11 of February 4, 1989 
on regional councils, defined the specific system of 
Tunisian territorial administration and, at the same 
time, the social and political relationships between 
the center and “interior regions.” In other words, 
the state administration configuration was shaped 
around strict control of local collectivities and sub-
sequently their affiliated citizens. But this effort to 
impose the center’s political hegemony over  Tunisian 
territory has resulted in a political identification 
with the interior as a “spatial imaginary,”34 which is 
described through the deeply distorting vocabulary 
of marginalization, disdain, and injustice.
Tunisian territorial administration was set up 
according to two logics that should have normally 
overlapped. First, the deconcentrated central state 
was devised around 24 governorates. Second, on the 
local level decentralization was based on the model 
of regional councils and communes. Practically, the 
deconcentration approach dominated in the ser-
vice of the centralized state as regional councils and 
communes had very few prerogatives and no mar-
gin for decision-making. This was due to an a priori 
control system in which the governor, nominated by 
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the state, and the Ministry of Interior had extensive 
supervisory powers.35 
Thus, the model stemming from the 1959 Constitu-
tion established an administratively deconcentrated 
state ruling over a geographically decentralized ter-
ritory. This configuration led to structural problems 
that blocked reform of the overburdened, anachro-
nistic Tunisian administration. It also created a sense 
of mistrust and lack of confidence in state institu-
tions, resulting in a tendency on the part of citizens 
to find solutions outside legal circuits perceived 
as slow, corrupt, and authoritarian. Ironically, but 
understandably, this culminated in the fortification of 
parallel economy circuits, causing more corruption 
and the incapacity of both the decentralized institu-
tions and central state representatives to deal with 
social, political, and economic challenges.
Functioning of the System after 2011
This institutional architecture explicitly demon-
strated its limits during the transitional period, as 
the special delegations created after the dissolution 
of regional councils fell short of performing their 
assigned duties under the new conditions created 
by the revolutionary context. Consequently, differ-
ent post-transition governments have had to face 
intense regional crises to which they could only 
offer artificial solutions. Realistically, when dealing 
with regional issues, the centralized state’s interven-
tion cannot be considered as a substitution for local 
authorities but rather as a supplement. In concrete 
terms, the latter should be able to address problems 
in their immediate environment without having to 
fully rely on the center’s guidance.
The last crisis at El Kamour in the governorate of 
Tataouine, where unemployed youth blocked the 
roads leading to oil wells to claim their region’s share 
in the oil produced on its land, has shown not only 
the very negative outcomes of the current configura-
tion, but also the state’s incapacity to deal with them 
politically.36 Thus, there is an obvious need to take 
steps towards the effective establishment of a stable 
and sustainable model of territorial administration, 
and to translate this into legislative measures.
35  See Sami Yassine Turki and Eric Verdeil, “Tunisie: La constitution (du printemps) ouvre le débat sur la decentralization,” in Local Governments and Public 
Goods: Assessing Decentralization in the Arab World, eds. Mona Harb and Sami Atallah (Beirut, 2015), pp. 14-24.
36  Carlotta Gall, “Young and Unemployed, Tunisians Agitate for a ‘Second Revolution’,” New York Times, May 27, 2017.
37  See “Riadh Mouakher : Ce n’est pas la fin du monde si le code des collectivités locales n’est pas adopté à temps,” Business News, August 22, 
2017 <http://www.businessnews.com.tn/Riadh-Mouakher--Ce-n%E2%80%99est-pas-la-fin-du-monde-si-le-code-des-collectivit%C3%A9s-locales-
n%E2%80%99est-pas-adopt%C3%A9-%C3%A0-temps-!,534,74338,3> (accessed December 18, 2017).
The Draft Code on Local Authorities: The Lack of 
Vision Underpinning State Restructuring
To create a valid alternative to the ineffective model 
of Tunisian territorial administration, it is important 
to grasp the principles included in Chapter VII of the 
2014 Constitution, including free administration, rep-
resentativeness, and participatory democracy. Polit-
ical discussions about decentralization, and more 
specifically the draft code on local authorities, show 
there is a trend towards dealing with the provisions 
of the chapter on local authorities as mere deliver-
ables.37 This attitude could lead to the adoption of a 
draft code on local authorities that represents noth-
ing more than a collection of idealistic and theoret-
ical decentralization principles which cannot realis-
tically be implemented by the Tunisian state in the 
light of its current challenges. This would not only 
be counterproductive but also represent a loss of the 
outstanding opportunity offered by the context of 
general political transition.
For example, the draft code is expected to implement 
a clear division of prerogatives not only between the 
centralized state and new local authorities, but also 
between the latter in the application of the Constitu-
tion. In fact, Article 134 provides that local authori-
ties have their own distinct attributes besides shared 
and transferred attributes from central powers, and 
which obey the principle of subsidiarity. Close read-
ing of Articles 12–23 of the current version of the 
draft code indicates that the division of prerogatives 
being implemented is highly vague and abstract. 
Although the current draft respects the provisions 
of the Constitution, it remains cautious about detail. 
This may be the result of the lack of a holistic vision 
There is a trend towards 
dealing with the chapter on 
local authorities as mere 
deliverables
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to set out the future structure of local powers and 
their prerogatives or, worse, a will to neutralize such 
a new configuration. In fact, the structure of the text 
opens the door to contradictory measures that will 
only hinder its legitimacy. As the draft code on local 
authorities does not allocate a chapter to deconcen-
tration, future initiatives may be used to neutralize 
decentralization efforts.
Clearly, the absence of a structured vision clarify-
ing roles and responsibilities will cause unnecessary 
expenditures and waste human resources and exper-
tise. Furthermore, without a clear and well-defined 
division that demonstrates the state’s willingness to 
actively undertake change, the draft code will not 
receive popular support. As well as the loss of human 
and financial resources that such measures would 
generate, it would also represent a missed oppor-
tunity to build confidence in state reform initiatives 
by delivering a token of trust to citizens who might 
then stop believing that the state takes with one hand 
what it gives with the other.
Another symptom of the lack of vision behind the 
draft code lies in its vague introduction of the princi-
ple of progressive implementation. While the pream-
ble to the draft code states that the radical scope of 
change introduced by decentralization requires pro-
gressive implementation, nothing is consecrated in 
the code itself or in the declared state policies. Com-
parative experiences show the importance of laying 
down the key steps of decentralization and territory 
evolution beforehand. For example, the French expe-
rience presents the case of a continuing decentral-
ization process whose general aspects are structured 
around acts or significant periods.38 
38  See Law 56-619 of June 23, 1956 (“Loi Defferre”) and Law 2004-809 of August 12, 2004 on local freedoms and responsibilities (“Loi Raffarin”).
39  Cyprien Avenel, “Enjeux et impact de la réforme territoriale sur la mise en œuvre des politiques sociales locales,” Working Paper, Conseil national des 
politiques de lutte contre la pauvreté et l’exclusion sociale (CNLE), 2015, p. 4 <http://www.cnle.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/NOTRe_polsoc_loc_Avenel_17091 5-docx.
pdf> (accessed August 6, 2017).
By completely omitting a timeline of application suit-
able to each mechanism and type of collectivity, the 
state will be exposed to new types of social and eco-
nomic claims to which it cannot realistically respond 
due to financial and material constraints. In order 
to be effective, the decentralization process must 
transfer major prerogatives to collectivities which, in 
reality, are neither prepared financially nor trained to 
endorse their new roles. If newly elected institutions 
fail to substitute former organizations due to their 
incapacity to perform their duties, the risks of social 
fragmentation and political delegitimization will be 
further exacerbated.
Recommendations
 - Take decentralization seriously
Decentralization cannot be dealt with as if it was a 
deliverable to be checked off. Decision-makers need 
to understand that the creation of a truly represen-
tative base lies at the decentralized level. Taking into 
consideration their current difficulties in dealing 
with social unrest, the creation of a peaceful social 
environment by ensuring a democratic political pres-
ence is something politicians cannot ignore.
 - Clearly formulate legal provisions which are derived 
from a well-structured political vision
The division of prerogatives should follow an effec-
tive distributive regime that explicitly establishes a 
general rule of competence in favor of communes to 
guarantee efficient local services, and protect them 
from interference from the state and other collectiv-
ities.39 This division should also clarify the exclusive 
domains of intervention granted to local authori-
ties. Furthermore, blocks of competence should be 
explicitly determined in areas concerning the shared 
and transferred prerogatives of local authorities to 
avoid conflicts of competence and the excessive use 
of litigation.
 - Rethink the new architecture of territorial admin-
istration to answer social, economic, and political 
problems
This rethinking must result from a comprehensive 
and holistic understanding of current capacities and 
citizens’ demands. A tailor-made process should 
The absence of a  structured 
vision on  responsibilities 
leads to a waste of 
 resources
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be initiated to addresses the specific problems of 
 Tunisian collectivities by interacting with those pri-
marily concerned, the citizens, instead of blindly 
and unilaterally applying theoretical principles of 
decentralization or comparative experiences without 
measuring their success. Rather than creating new 
hotbeds of political and social unrest by enacting 
ineffective laws, a participatory process of decen-
tralization will help the state better communicate on 
the current challenges and engage citizens in a new 
dynamic that would strengthen decentralization and 
establish the basis for a bottom-top political config-
uration. Since 2011, Tunisia has held multiple national 
consultations on ways to develop several sectors. 
A similar initiative would be an important first step 
preparing the ground for participatory democracy 
mechanisms at the regional level, on condition that 
it produces concrete results with real added value.
 - Ensure a progressive and strategic implementation 
of decentralization mechanisms 
Decision-makers will have to think seriously about 
pressing issues and consider a roadmap for reform, 
while taking into consideration the state’s finan-
cial, human, and material means. Such an oper-
ative method would provide the process with 
much-needed credibility and legitimacy. Moreover, 
strategic thinking on a progressive implementation 
timeline would provide an occasion to reflect upon 
key issues, such as local authorities’ capacity con-
straints-mainly due to regional disparities- and con-
crete equalization measures. 
The current combination of persisting social pres-
sure and an inability to conceptualize immediate 
solutions could finally be addressed by a mid- to 
long-term strategy that incorporates concrete ele-
ments such as training civil servants and local repre-
sentatives, and financial means. Beyond concretizing 
a much-needed transparent state communication, 
this would also allow the state to own the decentral-
ization process and channel its impact for the cre-
ation of political alternatives to extinguish the history 
of regional and interior conflict between the center 
and “anti-state” narrative.40 Combined with holding 
long-awaited municipal elections to offer the pos-
sibility of establishing legitimate and representative 
channels of communication, the initiation of a pro-
gressive and cooperative process of decentraliza-
tion would not only help to reshape the image of the 
state, but would also benefit all parties by giving rise 
40  David Featherstone, Anthony Ince, Danny Mackinnon, Kendra Strauss, and Andrew Cumbers, “Progressive Localism and the Construction of Political 
Alternatives,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 37 (April 2012), p. 177.
to a trained and experienced political elite from the 
regions. If established, the open negotiation of pow-
ers and prerogatives during the long, complex, and 
progressive process of decentralization could also 
achieve regional political equality and representation 
as well as economic and social balance.
Meriem Guetat is assistant professor at the Fac-
ulty of Legal, Political and Social Sciences of Tunis 
and assistant director of the Centre d’Études 
Maghrébines à Tunis (CEMAT). She holds a doc-
torate in public law from the University of Nice 
Sophia Antipolis, France.
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CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 
PARTNERSHIP IN PREVENTING 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN TUNISIA
Sadem Jebali
The Tunisian Government is undertaking efforts to 
counter the propaganda of extremist organizations 
through different activities, including the Alterna-
tive Narrative Platform (ANP). In order to increase 
its effectiveness, such a counter-narrative should be 
developed in partnership with civil society organiza-
tions, not only through social activities in areas where 
young people face a high risk of radicalization, but also 
through a focus on grassroots communication. In order 
to ensure that the ANP can function as a self-suffi-
cient entity that can develop appropriate messaging 
hand in hand with civil society organizations, several 
steps should be taken. First, a political buy-in should 
be secured to include other governmental actors in the 
process, without encroaching on the turf of ANP staff. 
Second, a research and monitoring cell should be cre-
ated within the platform. Third, a PR and communi-
cation cell should be created to start engaging with a 
wider audience of media actors. Fourth, a donors and 
civil society organizations coordination unit should be 
established, possibly in cooperation with some of the 
existing partners. Fifth, a local business development 
unit should be set up to leverage funding from Tunisian 
corporate actors for the different campaigns. Finally, 
the creation of these cells can be made at almost no 
cost, if dispatched throughout the ANP’s different 
international NGO partners under ANP leadership. 
The immediate driver of instability in the Middle 
East and North Africa is the lack of trust between 
citizens and the state. This distrust has developed 
due to longstanding failed education systems, high 
youth unemployment rates, and poor and corrupt 
governance and security regimes that take a draco-
nian approach to national security and ignore human 
security issues. State engagement – particularly in 
areas susceptible to violent extremism – is therefore 
perceived as hostile and unhelpful. This distrust pro-
vides fertile soil for narratives which argue that vio-
lence in the form of popular revolt, conflict, or violent 
extremism, is the only route to change.1
1  Michelle Dunne, “Is Unemployment to Blame for Radicalization?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (op-ed), May 22, 2015 <http://
carnegieendowment.org/2015/05/22/is-unemployment-to-blame-for-radicalization-pub-60179> (accessed October 21, 2017).
2  The Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq, December 2015 <http://soufangroup.
com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate_FINAL3.pdf> (accessed October 21, 2017).
3  “Exclusif – Kamel Akrout révèle la Stratégie nationale de lutte contre l’extrémisme et le terrorisme en Tunisie,” December 11, 2016 <http://www.
leaders.com.tn/article/21179-tout-sur-la-strategie-nationale-de-lutte-contre-l-extremisme-et-le-terrorisme> (accessed October 21, 2017).
The impacts of globalization (particularly in excluded 
areas), a command and control approach to the econ-
omy with the accompanying government corruption 
and over-regulation, and an education system that 
fails to equip young people with the necessary skills 
or resilience to manage these pressures, have com-
bined to create the perfect storm. 
Tunisia is one of the countries most affected in the 
region by the jihadi threat from within the country as 
well as from Libya.2 Following the attack by the rad-
ical Islamist group Ansar al-Chariaa on US govern-
ment facilities in Benghazi in 2012, and the group’s 
classification as a terrorist organization in 2013, Ansar 
al-Chariaa shifted its strategy from daoua (prosely-
tizing) to jihad against the state. The assassination of 
two political leaders in 2013, and the attacks on the 
Bardo Museum in Tunis and in the coastal resort of 
Sousse in 2015 represented an escalation by Islamic 
State-affiliated groups, such as the Oqba Ibn Nafaa 
Brigade. 
Faced with such escalation, two national strategies 
were drafted between 2014 and 2016, the key ele-
ments of which can be summarized as follows: 
 - prevention through working on the push-and-
pull factors of youth radicalization, with a partic-
ular focus on counter-narrative efforts; 
 - protection and reduction of citizens’ vulnerabil-
ity through a coherent plan based on integrated 
communication mechanisms;
 - pursuit and tracking of the terrorist groups’ 
resources; and
 - response and crisis management through mech-
anisms and legislation adequate to enhance the 
efficiency of the intervention. 
By the end of 2016, the national strategy was publicly 
announced, and a decree was adopted by parliament 
for the creation of a counter-narrative platform,3 
as the government has become more aware of the 
importance of strategic communication as a tool to 
counter violent extremism. A shift in the mindset of 
high security officials has also taken place, follow-
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ing the realization that collaboration is essential to 
develop communication campaigns that no longer 
focus on the government, but rather on the citizens. 
The Launch of the Alternative Narrative Platform
Identified as a key threat to national security by the 
Government of Tunisia (GoT) in its draft national 
counter-terrorism strategy, online extremist mes-
saging and recruitment is also at the core of the GoT’s 
latest flagship initiative: the launch of the Alternative 
Narrative Platform (ANP) which has received sup-
port from the British government through the  British 
Embassy, the British Council, and the Research Infor-
mation and Communications Unit. Led by the former 
Minister for Human Rights and Relations with Con-
stitutional Bodies and Civil Society, Kamel  Jendoubi, 
and his successor Mehdi Ben Gharbia, the ANP 
has resulted in the creation of a government body 
responsible for coordinating the design, production, 
and dissemination of an alternative narrative tar-
geted at segments of the population that are vulner-
able to violent extremist messaging, especially youth. 
While the GoTt’s interest for building strong mech-
anisms of counter messaging is still high, the con-
cretization is still far away from being reached due to 
the lack of skills and strategic vision for such a unit. 
Moreover, feedback collected during conversations 
with the stakeholders involved in the set-up of the 
ANP clearly underline the fact that there is a need for 
a continuous collaboration with other international 
actors working on the follow-up of jihadi messaging. 
Current Short-Comings
Initiatives such as Ala Khatrek Tounsi were launched 
during Ramadan in 2016, marking the first govern-
mental strategic communication output, and were 
followed by other initiatives, such as Houmet Al Ayla, 
which targeted returnees. The various campaigns 
have conveyed a completely independent message, 
seeking to create an alternative narrative that appeals 
to a wider group of Tunisians through a focus on the 
positive attributes of young Tunisian resilience. 
Mediated by international donors, civil society orga-
nizations (CSOs) endorsed the campaigns and took 
part in the offline activities of the Ala Khatrek Tounsi 
campaign, especially in radicalization hotpots such 
as Douar Hicher and Kabaria. Based on an assess-
ment of the actual capacities and the overall activ-
ities developed by the platform, specific challenges 
were identified and can be clustered within two main 
groups: organizational and resources challenges. 
These include:
 - the absence of donor coordination and a manage-
ment mechanism; 
 - the absence of a strategy for cooperation with 
CSOs; 
 - administrative tensions between representatives 
of the various ministries at the counter-narrative 
commission;
 - limited human resources (the platform employs 
six permanent public servants in addition to the 
director); 
 - limited expertise and skills within the platforms 
which recruit from among ministries; 
 - limited financial capacities and budgets due to 
the platform’s affiliation to the Ministry of Human 
Rights, which has the lowest ministerial budget; 
 - dependence on the UK as the major donor and 
actor; and
 - the absence of direct communication channels 
between civil society actors and private sector 
communications agencies. 
Recommendations
The GoT and relevant stakeholders should adopt 
an action plan containing several implementation 
steps to address the current short-comings (defined 
chronologically): 
 - Assess leverage 
At this stage, the most important step is to secure 
the approval and readiness of the leading actor(s) 
The government lacks skills 
and a vision for a counter 
messaging unit
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who will be proposing and endorsing the policy from 
within. The most suitable actors will be the deputy 
prime minister and the director of the platform. 
Finding the right narrative for both will be crucial 
for policy implementation success. The support of 
an organization – whether the British Council or the 
DGAP – to co-opt the policy brief will also be crucial, 
in terms of renown and institutional backup. 
 - Define the CSO-government partnership frame -
work 
To tackle the issues analyzed above, the ANP will 
need to undertake a strategic planning exercise with 
several civil society actors as potential partners for 
the platform. A structured partnership will be cru-
cial in defining roles and responsibilities, especially 
in the light of the lack of trust between members of 
the commission and wider CSOs.
 - Establish strategic units in order to ensure that the 
ANP can function as a self-sufficient entity that can 
develop appropriate messaging hand in hand with 
CSOs 
Four different cells should be established to increase 
the effectiveness of the ANP, namely a research and 
strategic monitoring cell, a public relations and com-
munication cell, a donors and CSO coordination cell, 
and a local business development cell. 
The research and strategic monitoring cell would 
provide information and guidance for all communi-
cation campaigns, and play a backstopping role in 
the dissemination of information and knowledge. 
Its activities could also include connecting with 
national researchers and organizing regular, the-
matic in-house sessions. CSOs should play a major 
role in this cell through the development of action 
research and providing platforms with access to vul-
nerable youth in radicalization hotspots. 
The public relations and communication cell would 
take the lead on account management and collabora-
tion with media partners, communications agencies, 
and production agencies. It would identify prospec-
tive new partners and organize press conferences 
around campaign launches. Civil society should be 
at the forefront of this work, while the government’s 
role would be to support NGO partners gain access 
to national public media.
The donors and CSO coordination cell would serve 
to identify potential donors for the platform’s activi-
ties, and define a selection process for partner NGOs 
to implement activities on behalf of the platform via 
international funding. Cyclical consultation with all 
commission members and bi-annual evaluation sys-
tems should be in place to assess the NGOs’ imple-
mentation progress. The evaluation commission 
would have several independent members to manage 
any potential tensions that might rise between the 
governmental commission and civil society actors. 
The local business development cell should explore 
possible ways to diversify the funding structure, and 
to introduce private sector contributions to cam-
paign development through co-opting mechanisms 
and commercial actions. 
Sadem Jebali is an independent consultant based 
in Tunis and Berlin. At the time of the workshop, 
he was enrolled in the public policy master’s pro-
gram of the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, 
Germany. While studying, he also worked as con-
sultant for the British Council in MENA with a spe-
cial focus on civil society-government relationship 
development in countering violent extremism.
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DERADICALIZATION AND THE 
PREVENTION OF RADICALIZATION 
OF TUNISIAN YOUTH THROUGH 
PEER PRESSURE, FAMILY, AND 
TRIBAL BONDS
Samah Krichah
Since 2012, Tunisia has seen an unprecedented rise in 
the number of radicalized young people. Over the last 
few years, the country witnessed several deadly ter-
rorist attacks. The jihadi organization Oqba Ibn Nafaa 
Brigade is affiliated to Al Qaida and has used Jebel 
Chaambi, a mountain peak in western-central Tunisia, 
as a rear base to conduct guerilla warfare operations 
in the region. However, over the last few years, jihad-
ists have also targeted popular tourist spots such as 
Sousse and the Bardo Museum in Tunis. These attacks 
have killed many tourists, cut visitors numbers to the 
country, and left Tunisia’s reputation as a promi-
nent holiday destination in tatters. Mobilizing social 
ties could contribute to countering jihadi radicaliza-
tion in Tunisia. This should include raising awareness 
and engaging families in the development of a stra-
tegic plan to prevent violent extremism, trust-build-
ing measures between families and security forces to 
enhance information sharing and the engagement of 
families and peers in deradicalization and reintegra-
tion processes of former extremists. 
Tunisia’s deradicalization and anti-terrorist strate-
gies are designed around a security-based approach 
or focus on socio-economic factors. The new 
national anti-terrorism strategy, centered around the 
newly created Centre National du Renseignement – 
whose mission is to elaborate punctual and periodic 
analysis, assess dangers and threats, make strategic 
choices in terms of intelligence, and elaborate the 
national intelligence plan – has recently been imple-
mented, and it will be some time before the success 
of the new approach can be assessed.
The roots of violent extremism in Tunisia and 
North Africa are diverse. However, as mentioned in 
the report “Engaging Families to Counter Violent 
4  Yassine Souidi, Julia Ebner and Saeida Rouass, “Engaging Families to Counter Violent Extremism in North Africa: Opportunities and Challenges,” 
Quilliam Foundation E-publications, 2016.
5  Ibid.
6  Olfa Lamloum, “Marginalisation, Insecurity, and Uncertainty on the Tunisian-Libyan Border: Ben Guerdane and Dhehiba From the Perspective of 
Their Inhabitants,” International Alert, December 2016 <http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/TunisiaLibya_MarginalisationInsecurityUn 
certaintyBorder_EN_2016.pdf> (accessed October 21, 2017).
7  Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle, “Together for Tunisia: Tribal Structures and Social and Political Mobilization,” Middle East Institute, October 19, 2016 <http://
www.mei.edu/content/map/together-tunisia-tribal-structures-and-social-and-political-mobilization> (accessed October 21, 2017).
8  Rida Kefi, “Assiste-t-on à la résurgence du clanisme et du tribalisme en Tunisie,” Kapitalis, April 26, 2011 <http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/3678-
assiste-t-on-a-la-resurgence-du-clanisme-et-du-tribalisme-en-tunisie.html> (accessed October 21, 2017).
9  Lamloum, “Marginalisation, Insecurity, and Uncertainty on the Tunisian-Libyan Border” (see note 6).
Extremism in North Africa: Opportunities and Chal-
lenges,”4 peer pressure and family, tribal, and social 
bonds can help explain why many young people join 
radical organizations.5 While this set of pull factors 
has been extensively examined in Libya, Iraq, Mali, 
and other countries, it has been critically overlooked 
in studies on jihadi radicalization and terrorism in 
Tunisia. 
Kinship
Shortly after its establishment, the French protec-
torate sought to settle the nomadic and semi-no-
madic tribes of the south and reach out to the settled 
tribes in the rest of the country to establish grass-
roots-level control.6 At the start of independence, 
President Bourguiba described Tunisia as a homoge-
nous country, where 98 percent of the population 
were Arab Sunni Muslims, and where there were 
no significant regional differences in culture, ways 
of life, or worldviews.7 This vision of a homogenous 
and unified Tunisia remained the dominant narra-
tive under Ben Ali’s rule. Following Bourguiba, Ben Ali 
promoted the concept of the “hegemony of the state” 
over differences in culture, social dynamics and con-
texts in an attempt to control the power of social ties. 
After the revolution, Tunisia witnessed several inci-
dents, including sporadic tribal clashes in the Gasfa 
region over positions in the local phosphate compa-
ny.8 Additionally, tensions occurred between tribes 
over the issue of arable land in the Douz region. As 
a result, several members of the fighting tribes were 
wounded or killed.
As stated in an International Alert report highlight-
ing the importance of tribal bonds in sustaining 
cross-border trade and humanitarian aid with Libya 
after 2011, kinship is key to preserving social peace in 
many regions in Tunisia.9 Tribal ties act as an infor-
mal social safety net in marginalized regions where 
the state has failed to address the grievances of the 
local population.
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Peer Pressure
Examining rap songs by singers from popular neigh-
borhoods in major urban centers, one of the most 
recurrent topics – alongside hatred of the state and 
security services – is the territorial inscription of 
identity carried by peer groups composed of friends 
from the same district or neighborhood. For instance, 
the rapper A.L.A from Zahrouni, a popular neighbor-
hood of western Tunis, repeats in his song “Identity”: 
“Where I come from, my 7ouma [neighborhood] is 
my safe home.”10 Like kinship, friends and neighbors 
represent a trusted support system for young peo-
ple and constitute a source of information, material 
support, and a group with which to identify. Along 
similar lines, Emino, a Tunisian rapper who joined 
the so-called Islamic State (IS), was considered a 
role model by many of his peers in popular neigh-
borhoods, whether for his music or his commitment 
to Jihadism. IS used popular figures such as Emino 
to attract young people in Tunisia and the Greater 
Maghreb region. Peer groups also represent a refuge 
and a support system for young people facing prob-
lems and tension within their families. Thus, many 
young Tunisians who joined IS confessed their inten-
tion to engage in jihad to their friends and/or loved 
ones. In a study carried out by the Tunisian Center 
for Research and Studies on Terrorism, many young 
people imprisoned on terrorist charges admitted 
they were regularly in touch with peers, especially 
on social media.11
Blind spots of Tunisia’s Counter-Terrorism 
 Strategy 
In 2016, the Tunisian government enacted its national 
counter-terrorism strategy. To this day, no official 
documentation has been published. Few attention 
has been paid to how jihadist groups have used local 
networks, kinship, and peers, or how these ties could 
help prevent and counter radicalization. Rather, 
the government has focused on building count-
er-narratives, enacting new security measures, and 
fighting corruption related to terrorism. However, 
as  McCauley and Moskalenko have demonstrated, 
twelve pathways to radicalization may be identified, 
which operate at three different levels: individual, 
10  <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T7yuNO8f5Qc> (accessed October 25, 2017).
11  Kamilia Ben Ayed, Mouldi Guissoumi, Riadh Ben Hamida, Imen Kochbati, Mariem Gzaza, Ahmed Mchaouech, Souheil Mdimegh, Najet Yaakoubi, Imen 
Gzaza, Heythem Zeibi, Ridha Raddaoui, Ameni Mekki, Raoudha Aouni, and Hatem Achech, Le Terrorisme en Tunisie à travers les dossiers judiciaries, Tunisian 
Center for Research and Studies on Terrorism, Tunisian Forum of Social and Economic Rights, 2016.
12  Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20 (July 
2008), pp. 415–33.
13  Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty– First Century (Philadelphia, 2008).
14  Joel Busher, The Making of Anti-Muslim Protest: Grassroots Activism in the English Defence League (London, 2015).
group, and the mass public. Jihadi groups use many 
channels to recruit young people. The authors argue 
that young people usually join radical groups through 
“personal connections.” In other words, young people 
tend to radicalize through “a network of friends, lov-
ers, and family.”12 Along those lines, a study conducted 
by the Tunisian Center for Research and Studies on 
Terrorism demonstrated how personal connections 
matter in the radicalization process. Analyzing a 
sample of more than 1,000 convicts held on terrorism 
charges, the study concluded that the influence of 
relatives and friends was the second most-cited rea-
son why young people decided to join radical groups. 
These case studies highlight the importance of peer 
pressure and family networks in spreading ideas, 
enhancing identification processes, and strengthen-
ing the sense of belonging to a community which, in 
turn, are also some of the most powerful recruitment 
tools. This confirms Marc Sageman’s “bunch of guys” 
theory, which states that group pressure “crushes 
doubts and prevents people from turning away,” and 
that this pressure was and still is powerful in turn-
ing young Muslims into jihadists.13According to Joel 
Busher,14 personal ties play a key role in the recruit-
ment and post-recruitment processes. In terms of 
the former, personal networks facilitate adherence 
to radical ideologies through several mechanisms. 
Personal connections serve as information channels 
and facilitate the first contact with radical groups. 
The recruiters’ mission is eased by the fact that they 
already know their potential recruits. The initial fear 
of joining a radical group is alleviated if recruits feel 
that their close environment will support their deci-
sion. In terms of the latter process of post-recruit-
Personal ties play a key 
role in the recruit ment and 
post-recruitment  processes
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ment, social networks facilitate tactical learning and 
shape the conceptions of legitimate actions.
Social and Tribal Ties Could Prevent Radicalization 
Presumably, the mechanism also works in reverse: 
positive peer pressure could prevent young people 
from adopting radical ideas and thus joining violent 
extremist groups. In Tunisia, the areas of Tozeur and 
Siliana can serve as interesting case studies. Indeed, 
although isolated and religiously conservative, these 
two governorates are among the least affected by 
violent extremism. Tozeur and Siliana are character-
ized by the prevalence of strong tribal ties which can 
work as a social safety network to counter radical-
ization. Similarly, the inhabitants of Ben Guerdane, a 
tribal community, stood by and even protected the 
security forces during the terrorist attack of March 
2016. Even though the informal nature of personal 
ties makes it difficult to establish a clear link between 
personal connections and radicalization, it can be 
maintained that personal ties play a significant role 
when it comes to individuals’ decisions to embrace 
radical ideologies.
In that vein, and on the issue of radicalism in I n-
donesia, Susan Sim and Noor Huda Ismail have ana-
lyzed how individuals convicted on terrorism charges 
found that by returning to the same connections in 
prison, they eventually repeated the trajectory that 
originally brought them into extremist violence.15 
They were pulled back in by one of four drivers: 
friendship, discipleship, group pressure, or economic 
pressure. Loyalty to friends and the group may per-
haps be the single most important factor in predict-
ing recidivism. Personal ties also contribute to the 
process of deradicalization or disengagement. Those 
same personal ties that characterize and hold radical 
political groups together can also precipitate their 
15  Noor Huda Ismail and Susan Sim, “Predicting Terrorist Recidivism in Indonesia’s Prisons,” The Brookings Institution (op-ed), January 28, 2016 <https://
www.brookings.edu/opinions/predicting-terrorist-recidivism-in-indonesias-prisons/> (accessed October 21, 2017).
16  Busher, The Making of Anti-Muslim Protest (see note 13).
collapse as groups are consumed by bitter squabbles 
and infighting.16
Recommendations
Taking into account the aforementioned elements, 
the government and civil society should acquire a 
better understanding of the immediate environ-
ment in which vulnerable youth, ex-extremists, and 
returnees evolve, and consider it an opportunity for 
prevention and deradicalization. This implies working 
together with their environment by recruiting sociol-
ogists, anthropologists, and psychologists. Trained 
social scientists are better suited to study social 
environments. Alongside social training to tackle the 
issue, friends and family should be convinced to sup-
port the process, and an iterative approach should 
be adopted, where mistakes and successes are taken 
into consideration to optimize the results. Thus the 
outcomes may be more sustainable and effective in 
the long term.
 - Strengthen family networks and parent-child rela-
tionships
A positive relationship between parents and children 
is key in developing non-violent behaviors. The fam-
ily support system prevents youth from looking for 
support beyond the family-based network. Mothers 
can be prevention actors. They are usually the best-
placed persons within the family to identify changes 
in behavior, vulnerabilities to violent extremism, or 
other harming behaviors. They can provide efficient 
counter-narratives to jihadist ideology, humanizing 
the impact of terrorism on the individual, the family, 
and the community.
 - Foster a positive relationship between elder male 
figures and young teenagers and men
In a patriarchal society like Tunisia, fostering a pos-
itive relationship between elder male figures and 
young teenagers and men can help spread cultural 
values opposed to the use of violence and compete 
with the image of distorted masculinity diffused by 
extremist recruiters within young audiences.
Positive peer  pressure 
could prevent 
 radicalization
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 - Raise awareness and engage families in the devel-
opment of a strategic plan to prevent violent 
extremism
Awareness-raising can be led through different chan-
nels. First, youth-led media programs targeting youth 
and tackling their problems, or educational programs 
training families to deal with changes in behavior, or 
how to integrate can be very effective. The media can 
also be used to broadcast the testimonies of reluctant 
or disengaged extremists to a large audience. Sec-
ond, religious courses and counseling tailored to deal 
with the existential questions troubling young people 
nowadays in a non-rigid way can be of great impact. 
Indeed, the Tunisian Ministry of Religious Affairs has 
empowered young religious counselors to reach out 
to young people. However, this initiative lacked both 
financial and logistical means. These activities would 
pave the way for more positive and non-violent pre-
vention counter-narratives within families and the 
surroundings of at-risk persons.
 - Create trust between family members and the secu-
rity forces to enhance cooperation and engage fam-
ilies in the deradicalization and reintegration pro-
cesses of former extremists
This can only be done when all family members, 
including women and children, are actively and 
equally engaged in the social and public life of the 
community. On the one hand, families are a key fac-
tor in the reintegration of former violent extremists. 
For instance, deradicalization programs in Saudi Ara-
bia have capitalized on the role of commitment to the 
family, or the desire to start a family, as a pull factor 
to encourage former violent extremists to renounce 
violence.17 On the other hand, constant emotional and 
financial support from family members, and assur-
ances that one of their members will not be rejected 
(disengaged jihadi), can compete with the sense of 
belonging that violent extremist groups offer to their 
adherents.
 - Engage peers in the creation of a new friendly envi-
ronment for at-risk youth and former extremists
Peers as friends, colleagues, or trained young peo-
ple can be a watchdog for changes in behavior and 
report to family members or specialists. Many civil 
society experiences can serve as examples, includ-
ing peer education about taboo subjects such as 
17  Amanda K. Johnston, “Assessing the Effectiveness of Deradicalization Programs on Islamist Extremists,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2009) <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a514433.pdf> (accessed October 21, 2017).
addiction and sexually transmitted diseases. This 
peer education could be carried out using creative 
and more youth-friendly means such as rap music, 
sport activities, and debates. In addition, old friends 
of extremists can act as a support system and provide 
guidance, reminding them of their old values, provid-
ing a spiritual and emotional home, and reintegrating 
them into daily life.
Samah Krichah is a MENA associate at the Wom-
en’s International League for Peace and Free-
dom. At the time of the workshop, she worked 
as project coordinator for the Gender Equality 
Community of Practice and as field researcher on 
radicalization and deradicalization at the Maghreb 
Economic Forum (MEF), a Tunisian think-and-do-
tank. She is also a member of the Tunisian think 
tank Labo’ Democratic and has been working on 
issues relating to the reform of the security ser-
vices and the secret police archive.
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ENNAHDA AND HIZB UT-TAHRIR 
– COOPERATIVE RIVALS OR 
BROTHERS-IN-ARMS?
Inna Rudolf
Against the backdrop of rising violent religious 
extremism among Tunisia’s most vulnerable youth, 
Ennahda’s unique selling point as the champion of the 
post-revolutionary Islamist project appears seriously 
undermined. Playing the “Muslim democrats” card 
has affected the party’s credibility among its more 
conservative grassroots who demand stronger com-
mitment to the foundations of Islamic government. 
An important question is how the party’s ambivalent 
relation with the elitist Hizb ut-Tahrir plays into the 
leadership’s efforts to strike a healthy balance between 
moderation, pragmatism, and ideological integrity. 
What appears at first glance to be a contestation for 
the hearts of periphery might also be a fragile divide 
and rule the arrangement between two brothers – if 
not in arms – then at least in approaches towards a 
shared vision.
With some 7,000 Tunisians having left Tunisia for 
the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
the question remains how the country, with its sec-
ular predisposition, has become a jihadist breeding 
ground. Disbelief in the political process has provided 
a fertile ground for radical Islamist organizations to 
exploit millennials’ loss of identity. Among disillu-
sioned conservative grassroots activists in particular, 
the power maximizing behavior of Tunisia’s moderate 
Islamist party Ennahda has created a momentum for 
political and ideological contestation. 
Extremist non-state actors have not shied away from 
capitalizing on the economic and ideological vulner-
ability of the country’s spatially, socially, and cultur-
ally marginalized. Their efforts to frame Ennahda as 
“salon Islamists” insufficiently committed to push for 
an ethical framework based on Sharia (Islamic law) 
have damaged the movement’s trustworthiness as 
champion of the post-revolutionary Islamic project. 
By rejecting its affiliation to “political Islam” at its 
May 2016 party congress, Ennahda has also freed the 
stage for more radical non-state actors to claim an 
alleged moral high ground.
18  Sherin Gharib and Cengiz Günay, “From Persecution to Government – Ennahda’s Claim to Power,” in Transformation in Tunisia: The First Five Years, 
ed. Wolfgang Mühlberger, European Institute of the Mediterranean, January 2017, pp. 77–106 <http://www.euromesco.net/images/joint_policy_studies/
euromesco% 20joint%20policy%20study%205.pdf> (accessed October 21, 2017).
19  Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, “Moderation through Exclusion? The Journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from Fundamentalist to Conservative 
Party,” Democratization 20, no. 5 (2013), pp. 857–75.
20  Ibid., p. 871.
21  Amel Boubekeur, “Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: Bargained Competition,” Mediterranean Politics 21, no. 1 (2016), pp. 107–27.
The Evolution of Ennahda towards Party Politics
Questioning the legitimacy of the concept of 
nation-building and the imperative of top-down 
secularization, young laymen sheikhs around Rachid 
Ghannouchi initiated the Islamic review al-Maarifa 
(The Consciousness) in 1970.18 Voicing commitment 
to the preservation of Islam which they framed as 
bottled-up in the light of leftist-dominated intellec-
tual debates, Ghannouchi and his followers founded 
the clandestine organization Jamaa al Islamiyya 
(Islamic Group) in 1972, which appealed strongly to 
students from across Tunisia’s marginalized hin-
terland. Encouraged by the engagement of Islamist 
activists, Jamaa members around Ghannouchi opted 
for consolidation and established the Mouvement de 
la Tendance Islamique (MTI) in 1981, from which the 
Ennahda party later evolved in 1989.19
In “Moderation through Exclusion? The Journey of 
the Tunisian Ennahda from Fundamentalist to Con-
servative Party,” Cavatorta and Merone analyze the 
Islamist party’s adaptation to mainstream democratic 
discourse through the prism of systemic repression 
and societal rejection. The authors emphasize that 
the experiences of imprisonment, exile and, last but 
not least, Tunisian society’s opposition to the move-
ment’s initial fundamentalist vision of Islam have 
urged Ennahda to adopt a more progressive stance 
on religious reformism.20
Having evolved into the best-organized opposition 
movement, Ennahda succeeded in capitalizing on 
the collapse of Ben Ali’s regime, obtaining 89 seats in 
the elections to the Constituent Assembly on Octo-
ber 23, 2011. The readiness to join forces with secular 
and leftist parties not only illustrated the movement’s 
strategic pragmatism during times of high political 
volatility. Even after losing the 2014 parliamentary 
elections due to socio-economic grievances, a sim-
ilar power-sharing pattern prevailed, resulting in the 
“bargained competition” and reconciliation between 
Ennahda and the old techno-bureaucratic elites rep-
resented by Nidaa Tounes.21
While Ennahda’s leadership has been eager to give 
an impression of a consensus-oriented conservative 
democratic actor, radical ideologists within the party 
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had voiced disapproval of the movement’s willingness 
to compromise on the inclusion of Sharia into the 
constitution as the “source among sources.”22 Another 
source of internal contradictions was the movement’s 
tainted relationship with the Salafist scene. Having 
acknowledged its failure to accommodate the polar-
ized Salafist milieu as a complementary grassroots 
movement following the assault on the American 
Embassy in Tunis in September 2012, Ennahda expe-
rienced another turning point in its development. 
Under increasing pressure to forge an alliance with 
the country’s Salafist spectrum, Ennahda chose to 
reiterate its commitment to the liberal democratic 
system by harshly condemning the attacks and ban-
ning Ansar al-Sharia, the group responsible. 
In a revolutionary attempt to distance itself categori-
cally from radical extremism, the movement officially 
renounced the label “Islamism” during its 10th party 
congress held in May 2016. In his statement to Foreign 
Affairs, Rachid Ghannouchi defended the decision by 
saying that “the state no longer imposes secularism 
through repression, so there is no longer a need for 
Ennahda or any other actor to defend or protect reli-
gion as a core part of its political activity.”23
Conceived as an act of pragmatism, this decision soon 
earned the party criticism for allegedly abandoning 
its core perception of “Islam and politics as belong-
ing to an organic sphere,” as Larbi Sadiki commented 
to Al Jazeera shortly after the party congress.24 Fur-
thermore, in “The Future of Political Salafism in 
Egypt and Tunisia,” George Fahmi emphasizes that 
Ennahda’s conciliatory gestures have undermined its 
credibility in the eyes of its former ultra-conservative 
supporters: “Some Salafist-Jihadist voices explicitly 
accused the Ennahda movement of being a US satel-
lite, deviating from the path of the Islamic project, 
and attempting to please Western countries, even at 
the expense of Islam and its provisions.”25
22  Gharib and Günay, “From Persecution to Government” (see note 18), p. 91.
23  Rachid Ghannouchi, “From Political Islam to Muslim Democracy: The Ennahda Party and the Future of Tunisia,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 
2016 <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/tunisia/political-islam-muslim-democracy> (accessed October 21, 2017).
24  Larbi Sadiki, “Why is Tunisia’s Elite Ditching Political Islam?” Al Jazeera, May 24, 2016 <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/tunisia-ennahda-
ditching-political-islam-160524094550153.html> (accessed October 21, 2017).
25  Georges Fahmi, “The Future of Political Salafism in Egypt and Tunisia,” Carnegie Middle East Center, November 16, 2015 <http://carnegie-mec.
org/2015/11/16/future-of-political-salafism-in-egypt-and-tunisia-pub-61871> (accessed October 21, 2017).
26  Anne Wolf, Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda (London, 2017).
27  Author’s interview with Hizb ut-Tahrir officials conducted in July in Tunis.
28  Wolf, Political Islam in Tunisia (see note 26), p. 146.
Between Co-optation and Contestation: Ennahda’s 
Relations with Hizb ut-Tahrir
The Tunisian branch of the international pan-Is-
lamist Hizb ut-Tahrir party (The Liberation Party) 
was established in 1977 under the leadership of 
Shaykh ‘Abd al-Qadim. In an uncompromising tract 
from March 8, 1985, the Tunisian arm called “on the 
sons of the grand Islamic umma to rise with [it] and 
to work to establish the Caliphate which the impious 
coloni zers have suppressed and to re-establish Islam 
in the Islamic territories.”26 Even though the impera-
tive of reviving Islamic values may at first glance echo 
the above-mentioned slogans of Ennahda and its 
ideological predecessors from the 1980s and 1990s, 
the explicit incitement to aspire to a Caliphate state 
certainly differs from the contemporary narrative 
by Ennahda representatives seeking international 
endorsement as Tunisia’s “Muslim democrats.” Nev-
ertheless, Hizb ut-Tahrir members still refer off the 
record to Ennahda as “brothers in methods” (ikhwān 
al-manahij), even if officially they criticize Ennahda’s 
path towards secularization.27 The question remains 
what accounts for these ambivalent dynamics of loy-
alty and disavowal on behalf of Ennahda’s puritan 
counterpart.
Like Ennahda, Hizb ut-Tahrir activists were forced to 
operate clandestinely under the repressive measures 
adopted by Bourgiba and later Ben Ali. It was not until 
Ennahda had assumed leadership of the Troika gov-
ernment that Hizb ut-Tahrir was officially legalized in 
July 2012.28 Although Hizb ut-Tahrir has deliberately 
distanced itself from Salafi currents, Ennahda’s strat-
egy towards the Liberation Party strongly resem-
Hizb ut-Tahrir call 
Ennahda off the record 
“brothers in methods”
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bles the attempted persuasion strategy vis-à-vis the 
Salafi movement to co-opt and eventually moderate 
preachers who had not yet engaged actively in armed 
activities. 
This hope of reversing Islamist radicalism is clearly 
demonstrated in the statement of a Nahdawi offi-
cial recorded during a Crisis Group interview in 
Tunis in September 2012: “We have encouraged 
them to request legalization. The simple fact that 
they request authorization from the prime minister 
implies that they see the law as a positive thing. They 
will eventually accept the rules of the game. Their 
radical projects will be thwarted. They put forward 
political programs that are contrary to the reality of 
Tunisians today. Political integration will dilute their 
radical discourse.”29 What becomes apparent in this 
testimonial is Ennahda’s political gambit to tame 
hardliners by “letting off steam” and betting on the 
familiar “inclusion-moderation hypothesis.” 
Acknowledging the problematic conceptualizations 
within the predominantly normative interpretation 
of the inclusion-moderation paradigm as raised 
by Kasper Ly Netterstrøm in his article on “The I s-
lamists’ Compromise in Tunisia,”30 Hizb ut-Tahrir’s 
perception of Ennahda’s own moderation course and 
its implications for the Liberation Party’s flexibility 
towards political activism should be emphasized. 
Author interviews with supporters and representa-
tives of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Tunis only underline the 
party’s willingness to undertake tactical concessions 
in the face of political opportunities without neces-
sarily relativizing the omnipresence of its ideological 
framework.
29  International Crisis Group, “Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge,” Middle East/North Africa Report no. 137, 2017 <https://d2071andvip0wj.
cloudfront.net/tunisia-violence-and-the-salafi-challenge.pdf> (accessed October 21, 2017).
30  Kasper Ly Netterstrøm, “After the Arab Spring: The Islamists’ Compromise in Tunisia,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 4 (October 2015), pp. 110–24.
31  Ghannouchi, “From Political Islam to Muslim Democracy” (see note 23).
To comprehend the underlying dynamics, it is 
important to underline that while Ennahda is char-
acterized by a broad and diverse support base and 
political mobilization capacity, Hizb ut-Tahrir has 
remained a distinctly elitist organization maintaining 
exclusive membership criteria such as the qualifying 
examination described by members. In this respect, 
the political ambitions of Hizb ut-Tahrir remain 
confined to raising awareness about their ideologi-
cal vision and serving as a moral compass to ruling 
elites. To be able to pursue these normatively framed 
functions, Hizb ut-Tahrir have actively sought for-
mal registration as a political party even though they 
reject a secular democratic system as a corrupt and 
unsustainable form of governance.
When asked to comment on Ennahda’s contemporary 
narrative and policy work, a representative of Hizb 
ut-Tahrir’s administrative commission reiterated 
that such compromising gestures apparently reveal 
Ennahda’s one true face of a secular movement, one 
that is no longer Islamist in any sense. The main crit-
icism referred to the fact that Ennahda’s leadership 
– explicitly excluding the figures of Sadek Chourou 
and Habib Ellouze from this generalization, who are 
broadly regarded as representatives of the party’s 
hardliner wing – merely perceives of Islam as a moral 
reference, while Hizb ut-Tahrir understands Islam as 
the sole guiding principle meant to rule over the life 
of the individual. Phrased in that manner, one can-
not help but acknowledge that this implied difference 
between Ennahda’s and Hizb ut-Tahrir’s stance on 
the issue of secularism and the place of religion in 
politics and society feeds excellently into Ennahda’s 
self-portrayal as “Muslim democrats.”31
Furthermore, and in the light of the fact that other 
interviewed Hizb ut-Tahrir members do not shy 
away from highlighting Ennahda’s uncanny prag-
matism, the question emerges whether the alleged 
clash of convictions is indeed a real clash at all. One 
should not exclude the scenario in which Ennahda 
consciously profits from allowing an ideological 
hardliner to defend politically inconvenient posi-
tions such as the institution of a Sharia law system. 
This would provide Ennahda with the opportunity to 
claim credit among its more conservative grassroots 
for granting Hizb ut-Tahrir a green light to operate 
officially under the legal umbrella of the constitution 
without necessarily incriminating itself for question-
As opposed to Ennahda, 
Hizb ut-Tahrir has 
 remained a distinctly  elitist 
organization
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ing the constitutional “freedom of conscience and 
belief” (hurriet al-damir).
Ennahda’s Pragmatism: Gains and Losses
A carefully negotiated burden and risk-sharing 
agreement between what may seem at first glance 
to be non-competitors, such as Ennahda and Hizb 
ut-Tahrir, may prove beneficial by further untying 
Ennahda’s hands to construct its image as a party 
whose “values are already aligned with democratic 
values.”32 Ennahda’s efforts on this path are exempli-
fied by the party’s unconventional positions on the 
abolition of harsh sentences for the consumption of 
soft substances such as hashish,33 the individual right 
not to fast during the holy month of Ramadan,34 and, 
last but not least, Ali Layaradh’s recent support for 
gender equality regarding Tunisia’s inheritance law.35
Nevertheless, this window of opportunity to play the 
liberal card while still scoring among the conser-
vative base for projecting a benevolent stance vis-
à-vis selected actors from within the Islamist wing 
does not come without a price. The efforts of radi-
cal and anti-system extremists to frame Ennahda as 
“salon Islamists” unable and insufficiently commit-
ted to push for the implementation of Sharia law as 
an ideal ethical framework continue to damage the 
movement’s trustworthiness as the champion of the 
post-revolutionary Islamic project. Furthermore, by 
publicly rejecting its affiliation to “political Islam” at 
its May 2016 party congress, Ennahda has also freed 
the stage for more radical and uncompromising 
actors to capitalize on the party’s moderation course 
claiming an alleged “moral high ground.”
In this context, both national and international stake-
holders need to start questioning the presupposed 
benefits of a top-down imposed laïcité (secularity), 
and even encourage moderate Islamist parties to 
appeal more strongly to locally rooted belief systems 
and cultural understandings. Linking universal values 
such as tolerance, respect, and solidarity with the 
concept of “la tunisianité” largely associated with the 
bourgeoisie, can prove counter-productive among 
socially and culturally disenfranchised youth and 
can deepen and even trigger toxic social divisions. 
32  Ibid.
33  Sarah Souli, “Will Tunisia Finally Amend Harsh Cannabis Law?” Al-Monitor, February 2017 <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/contents/articles/
originals/2017/02/tunisia-arrests-cannabis-weed-marijuana-change-law.html> (accessed October 21, 2017).
34  Hamadi Jebali, “The face of moderate Islamism in Tunisia,” National Post, October 2011 <http://nationalpost.com/news/hamadi-jebali-the-face-
of-moderate-islamism-in-tunisia> (accessed October 21, 2017), and Lotfi Zitoun, “Le jeûne du Ramadan, entre religieux et politique,” Leaders, June 2017 
<http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/22576-lotfi-zitoun-le-jeune-du-ramadan-entre-religieux-et-politique> (accessed October 21, 2017).
35  “Âpre débat autour de l’égalité dans l’héritage en Tunisie,” Telquel.ma, August 2017 <http://telquel.ma/2017/08/18/apre-debat-autour-legalite-
lheritage-en-tunisie_1557957> (accessed October 21, 2017).
According to this logic, the process of  Ennahda’s 
stylization as a member of the elitist milieu might 
become a decisive factor in utterly alienating the 
young disenfranchised periphery from institutional 
politics or losing them to much more radical move-
ments than the currently non-violent Hizb ut-Tahrir 
which, for now, still rejects the possibility of contest-
ing Ennahda’s position by participating in parliamen-
tary elections.
Inna Rudolf is a research fellow at the Interna-
tional Centre for the Study of Radicalization and 
Political Violence (ICSR) based in the Department 
of War Studies at King’s College London. At the 
time of the workshop, she represented the BMW 
Foundation Herbert Quandt in the Middle East 
and North Africa region. In this capacity, she also 
held the position of research director for the Tuni-
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TUNISIAN FEMALE CROSS-
BORDER TRADERS IN ALGERIA 




Tunisian female cross-border traders in Algeria nego-
tiate their gendered role in a male-dominated eco-
nomic sector as well as their social and economic mar-
ginalization as heads of their households and/or the 
sole breadwinners. They enter into direct competition 
with Tunisian men in a challenging economic sector: 
informal trade. Female cross-border traders in Tunisia 
come from socially and economically precarious back-
grounds, and often have non-sustainable jobs, thus 
making them vulnerable to exploitation due to the dire 
economic situation in society at large. In the absence 
of sustainable government solutions to their margin-
alization, Tunisian policymakers and European stake-
holders should provide more support for these women, 
devise strategies for alternative sources of income, 
activate free trade zones, and place female traders at 
the heart of the government’s war against corruption.
Over the past few years, many Tunisians started mak-
ing occasional trips to Algeria as the new destination 
for cheap merchandise, to purchase goods to resell 
or for family use. The Tunisian Office for Tourism 
has reported that thousands of Tunisians traveled 
in early 2017 to Algeria for alleged tourism, mostly in 
Sétif, El Eulma, Jijel, Béjaïa, Tlemcen, and Oran. But it 
is rather “Shopping tourism” that is taking place and 
that is particularly popular in the cities that border 
Algeria and Tunisia.1
Many Tunisian women have been among this group 
and they entered Algeria to trade in the last few years. 
Most of these short trips pass through the four func-
tional border crossings between Tunisia and Algeria.2 
These women are considered active participants in 
the economic activity of their households and neigh-
borhoods, and are even trusted by their spouses 
when traveling alone.3 Since the Tunisian revolution, 
the “feminization” of cross-border trade is proof of an 
1  “Le Shopping des Tunisiens en Algérie”, L’Expression le Quotidien, April 2, 2017 <http://www.lexpressiondz.com/autres/de_quoi_jme_mele/263742-le-
shopping-des-tunisiens-en-algerie.html> (accessed October 21, 2017).
2  The author’s trip in May 2017 to Annaba (Algeria) with two female traders in a louage (shared rented vehicle) from downtown Tunis’ main station. 
Annaba, Sétif and Oued Souf have replaced Tripoli and other Libyan border towns such as Zuwara, Zawiya, and Zolten as the new sites of cheap products 
subsidized by the Algerian state.
3  In Tunis’ Bab Alioua bus station, a daily bus to Annaba leaves with many women on board traveling to Algeria for trade. Author’s observation in May 
2017.
4  “Economie: La classe moyenne tunisienne est passée de 80% à 67% en quelques années,” Webmanagercenter, December 24, 2015 <http://www.
webmanagercenter.com/2015/12/24/167652/economie-la-classe-moyenne-tunisienne-est-passee-de-80-a-67-en-quelques-annees/> (accessed August 
21, 2017).
increasing gender transgression of traditional gender 
roles in the context of social and economic marginal-
ization. Indeed, nowhere is feminization more visible 
in Tunisia’s economic landscape than in the infor-
mal trade sector. The trend has started in the 1990s, 
mainly in Tunisian working-class areas, with Tunisian 
women traveling to countries such as Turkey and 
Morocco for trade. Like their middle- and upper-class 
female peers, these women feel empowered by brav-
ing the risks of traveling abroad alone. Their sense of 
empowerment, like that of women from more privi-
leged backgrounds, stems from their economic inde-
pendence, resisting patriarchy, and braving dangers. 
They are often overshadowed by their counterparts 
from more affluent backgrounds, and are rarely given 
credit due to their invisibility in the public sphere.
But this feminization of cross-border trade is symp-
tomatic of an economic malaise in many precari-
ous Tunisian households. The pauperization of the 
 Tunisian working class and the shrinking of the mid-
dle class (from 80 percent before 2011 to 67 percent 
in 2015),4 compounded by the economic crisis that 
mostly hit middle-class Tunisian households, have 
pushed many women from modest backgrounds to 
engage in what is generally perceived to be the riskier 
business venture of cross-border trade. Many women 
are struggling to make ends meet, either as house-
wives trying to help their spouses with household 
expenses, or as widows or divorcees, the sole bread-
winners providing for their families. Some of these 
women cross the border to trade in Algeria against 
their will, usually out of economic necessity, and 
would happily exchange this job for something more 
economically sustainable. Increasing their hardship 
are tighter controls by authorities as a result of more 
smuggling activities.
Female Cross-Border Traders between Smugglers 
and the Authorities
Fuel smuggling has become a challenge for Tunisian 
cross-border traders in the impoverished Tunisian 
towns of Le Kef and Kasserine. Regarded by Tunisian 
authorities as competition with domestic products, 
customs officials at the various border posts have 
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been trying to impose restrictions and tighten con-
trol of imports from Algeria. Cross-border traders are 
caught in the vicious cycle of informal trade – which 
is tolerated by Tunisian authorities – and smuggling, 
which the authorities consider a threat to the Tuni-
sian economy, as well as a conduit for mafia groups 
and terrorist activities. 
Having to navigate between both legal and illegal eco-
nomic activity in the eyes of the Tunisian authorities, 
they enter into confrontation with border officials to 
allow them to carry out their business without imped-
iment. In some cases, officials take bribes for allowing 
cross-border traders to bring in more than the allowed 
amount into Tunisia. Some customs officials have even 
built a strong network with traders, allowing them to 
bring in large quantities of products in return for a 
share of the imported goods. By negotiating with the 
Tunisian border authorities – in particular over the 
amount of currency they can take out of Tunisia and 
the volume of products they purchase from Algeria – 
female traders have become experts in the art of deal-
ing with a stringent border security system.
Female Cross-Border Traders and the War on 
Corruption
The Tunisian government has been struggling 
between a desire to fight smuggling and to keep 
things under control through a policy of laissez-faire 
towards cross-border traders, while still trying to 
enforce transparency and accountability. Some 
have observed that the current war on corruption 
launched by Prime Minister Youssef Chahed testifies 
to the government’s attempt to formally break with 
impunity in this sector.
However, in the absence of deep reforms, instances of 
corruption in informal trade (the frequent low-level 
bribing of customs officials) are making the prime 
minister’s “clean hands operation” look increasingly 
problematic. The problem lies in the inability of suc-
cessive post-Ben Ali governments to address the 
economic and social woes of Tunisian households, 
and to prevent what some Tunisian observers have 
described as the “democratization” of corruption. 
Indeed, many Tunisians agree that corruption under 
Ben Ali was bad, but post-revolution Tunisia has seen 
a rampant form of corruption practiced with total 
5  Seïf Soudani “Corruption. Vague d’arrestations: une guerre contre les «nouveaux riches»?” Le courrier de l’Atlas, May 25, 2017 <http://www.
lecourrierdelatlas.com/tunisie-corruption-vague-d-arrestations-une-guerre-contre-les-«-nouveaux-riches-»--8318> (accessed August 6, 2017).
6  The Aatik project of autonomy for rural women in the northwestern Tunisian town of Aroussa (governorate of Siliana) was initiated by two young 
women from Germany and Canada, and funded by Canadian Embassy in Tunis. See also Christine Petré, “Tunisia: Bringing the Global Market to Rural 
Women Weavers”, World Bank Blogs, April 3, 2016 <http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/voices/tunisia-bringing-global-market-rural-women-weavers> 
(accessed August 6, 2017).
impunity by almost every official in power to such 
an extent that corruption flourishes in a democratic 
environment, remaining unchallenged and even 
state-tolerated due to a lack of effective oversight in 
holding the culprits accountable.
The Tunisian authorities tend to buy peace of mind 
by turning a blind eye to low-level corruption at 
border crossings, regarding it as harmless. This can 
be dangerous when one considers the porous bor-
der with Algeria that can be used as transit passages 
for illicit activities including drugs and weapons. 
Female  traders are vulnerable to illicit smuggling 
networks, and can be used as soft targets to bypass 
strict Tunisian security measures in the form of 
customs, national guards, border police, and the 
Tunisian army. The quasi-absence of trust between 
cross-border  traders and border control officials has 
intensified with the rising confrontation between 
them. In particular, this affects both those from bor-
der areas with no other means of subsistence, as well 
as cross-border traders, including women who often 
complain about border control officials confiscating 
their products and asking them to pay bribes to get 
them across.
When the Tunisian prime minister declared war on 
corruption in May 2017, smuggling became the tar-
get of his large-scale operation.5 A series of arrests 
of businessmen connected to smuggling signaled 
the beginning of a shakeup operation to clamp 
down on smuggling networks along the borders 
with Algeria and Libya. This war is likely to affect 
female cross-border traders as this sector will also 
come under heavy scrutiny. Female traders will feel 
increased surveillance from border officials of their 
commercial activities.
Recommendations
 - Support female entrepreneurship as alternative 
sustainable sources of income
Women should be provided with financial incentives 
to start their own businesses and adopt a more sus-
tainable business model.6 While this business ven-
ture may be an exception to the rule, it can serve as 
a starting point for the promotion of social business 
entrepreneurship aimed at marginalized areas in 
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Tunisia. For instance, Yunus Social Business Tunisia7 
assists with funding programs for social entrepre-
neurship projects in impoverished areas of the coun-
try. Women can also obtain financial support from 
EU-funded projects aimed at marginalized areas.8 
 - Improve female traders’ safety and security at bor-
der crossings
Women should be empowered and encouraged to 
denounce corrupt practices by officials at border 
posts and, ideally, qualified female border cross-
ing officers should be appointed from among local 
unemployed graduates, who can serve as a point of 
contact between locals and the authorities.
Tightening border control security at the border 
crossing with Algeria could be achieved by introduc-
ing a scanner system to speed up the control process, 
and preventing the entry of illicit products by using 
sniffer dogs. This can effectively deter smugglers 
from exploiting women’s status as “harmless” when 
paying their way through security and customs.
 - Legally protect female traders from exploitation
In late July 2017 Tunisian lawmakers unanimously 
voted in a law to criminalize gender-based vio-
lence. One of the measures of the new legislation is 
the criminalization of economic abuse and violence 
against women. It should be stipulated that all types 
of economic exploitation – including coercing female 
laborers and workers into harsh working conditions 
without social security coverage – should be crim-
inalized.9 This legal framework can serve as a step-
ping stone to regulate women’s work in the informal 
trade sector, where women often do not own their 
own vehicles, and are therefore more prone to being 
coerced into dealing with male smugglers who own 
7  Yunus Social Business Tunisia main homepage: <http://www.ysbtunisia.com> (accessed October 21, 2017).
8  The Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
devised partnership programs promoting Tunisian women in rural areas, their involvement in decision making, and female entrepreneurship. See “Profil Genre 
de la Tunisie 2014” <https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/rapport_national_genre_tunisie_201 4_version_courte_fr.pdf> (accessed October 21, 2017).
9  “In the Assembly of the Representatives of People, demands of the criminalization of all types of economic exploitation of women”, Assabah, July 25, 
2017 <http://www.assabah.com.tn/article/139241/-بتجريم-المطالبة-النواب-مجلس-في>كافة-أشكال-االستغالل-االقتصادي-للنساء2017). 3, September (accessed 
10  The author learnt during her trip to Algeria that female traders sometimes had to pay 500 Tunisian dinars (about 180 Euros) to male Tunisian 
smugglers, usually from border areas, to transport merchandise such as electronic equipment and household appliances through unofficial border routes 
that these experienced smugglers are familiar with.
11  Journal Officiel de la République Tunisienne, “Décret gouvernemental 2016-100 du 11 janvier 2016, portant création de l’Office National des Postes 
Frontaliers Terrestres,” January 11, 2016 <http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/news/tf20161003.pdf> (accessed October 21, 2017).
12  “Protesting Youth Again Close the Hezoua Border Crossing in Tozeur” [in Arabic], Babnet, May 2, 2017 <https://www.babnet.net/cadredetail-142104.
asp> (accessed October 21, 2017).
13  Tunisia 2020 international conference, Tunis, November 29–30, 2016, “Free Trade and Logistics Zone in Ben Guerdane” <http://www.tunisia2020.com/
en/projet/free-trade-and-logistics-zone-in-ben-guerdane/> (accessed September 3, 2017).
14  “Hamila Duty Free va réaliser une Zone de Repos et un Free Shop à Melloula (Tabarka),” Tustex, May 16, 2017 <https://www.tustex.com/economie-
actualites-des-societes/economie-hamila-duty-free-va-realiser-une-zone-de-repos-et-un-free-shop-a-melloula-tabarka> (accessed October 21, 2017).
vehicles, and charge prohibitive prices to carry mer-
chandise across the border.10
 - Activate stalled free trade zone projects in border 
areas
Since the revolution, local communities in border 
areas have been campaigning for the activation of 
stalled free trade zone projects, particularly in Le Kef 
and Tozeur. The creation of the National Agency of 
Land Border Crossings within the Ministry of Trans-
port11 to manage traffic in the border areas should 
further boost development of marginalized areas 
and ease the activation of free trade zone projects 
with Algeria, as promised by the Tunisian authori-
ties.12 These projects are still on hold, as the Tunisian 
authorities had to prioritize other projects along the 
border areas with Libya, particularly in Ben Guer-
dane, whose long-awaited free trade zone project has 
recently been given the green light.13
The border areas in Kasserine, Ain Draham-Tabarka, 
Kef, and Tozeur could become free trade zones, 
where the economies of these communities could 
thrive, making the temptation towards illicit activities 
such as smuggling less alluring to the most vulnerable 
citizens. The Tunisian authorities’ establishment of a 
pilot model free trade zone project in the port city of 
Tabarka could boost the local economy by reducing 
unemployment and establishing businesses there.14
Houda Mzioudet is a Tunisian journalist, researcher, 
and consultant focusing on Tunisian and Libyan 
affairs. At the time of the workshop, she was a 
nonresident research assistant in the Middle East 
program of the Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace. She holds an MA in Cultural Studies 
from the University of Manouba, Tunis.
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A STUDENT-CENTERED APPROACH 
TO HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM IN 
TUNISIA
Molka Abassi
The recently approved reform plan for Tunisian higher 
education fails to put the student at the center of the 
system. It lacks a student perspective and overem-
phasizes governance, fiduciary, and administrative 
changes at the expense of quality learning adapted to 
the job market. Only through a focus on students can 
higher education reform reach its key goal of graduate 
employability. To achieve quick gains, a range of steps 
should be taken, including: allowing undergraduate 
access to the university Research & Development appa-
ratus to provide invaluable pre-job market research 
experience, permitting cross-registration at different 
universities to give students the flexibility they need 
for learning development, and easing administrative 
burdens through IT tools.
Long considered a regional model in higher educa-
tion, Tunisia has achieved impressive results with its 
aggressive investment in its university system, one of 
the highest rates in the region. Indeed, over the last 
twenty years, the country’s share of public spend-
ing on higher education remained one of the largest 
state budgets. Paradoxically, despite such commit-
ment, graduate unemployment remains strikingly 
high at 31 percent,15 predominantly due to discrep-
ancies between the university system and the labor 
market. Conscious of the urgent need for reform, the 
government prepared a series of measures to address 
the shortcomings of the university system. 
However, the current plan’s emphasis on governance, 
administrative, and fiduciary matters fails to push for 
the essential goal of higher education: quality learn-
ing adapted to the job market. By neglecting students 
and focusing on elements other than the final prod-
uct the university system aims to create, the cur-
rent reform plan merely addresses peripheral issues 
instead of tackling the structural problem: graduates’ 
readiness to enter the labor market.
The Tunisian University System
The formation of the Tunisian university system dates 
to 1960, when the University of Tunis was established 
15  National Institute of Statistics website <http://www.ins.tn/fr/publication/note-sur-lenqu%C3%AAte-nationale-de-l%E2%80%99emploi-t1-2016> 
(accessed October 25, 2017).
16  The European Higher Education Area and the Bologna Process <http://www.eua.be/policy-representation/higher-education-policies/the-european-
higher-education-area-and-the-bologna-process> (accessed October 25, 2017).
by combining existing institutes across the coun-
try. It was subsequently divided into three universi-
ties (Tunis, I, II, and III) in 1988. Today, it is overseen 
by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research (MESRS) and follows the Bologna process16 
License-Master-Doctorate (LMD) model. The univer-
sity system has since developed significantly. 
Tunisia currently boasts 13 public universities, 46 
private universities, 6 teacher training institutes, and 
24 applied technical institutes (ISETs), none of which 
are included in any international university rankings 
as they do not adhere to the standards and criteria 
set by QS World University Rankings and Shanghai 
Academic Ranking of World Universities. This expan-
sion, together with a policy for baccalaureate laure-
ates to automatically enter bachelor programs, has 
led to an expansion of higher education, reaching a 
student population of 500,000 in 2015. Indeed, once 
baccalaureate laureates have completed high school 
they are guaranteed enrollment at a university and 
assigned to a specific program based on their scores, 
prioritized preferences, and the number of places 
available on each course. Such expansion was not, 
however, accompanied by job creation, and has thus 
created a significant increase in graduate unemploy-
ment, and the need for urgent structural reforms.
The Reform Plan
The proposed reform plan and its accompanying 
draft law were developed by the National Reform 
Commission using a participatory approach. Key 
stakeholders included ministry officials, university 
presidents, professors and students, and parlia-
mentarians, as well as representatives of the private 
sector, civil society organizations (CSOs), and labor 
unions. Based on the diagnosis undertaken from 2012 
to 2015, five major pillars were chosen as the pri-
mary axes in which specific technical and thematic 
sub-commissions will specialize, namely: the quality 
of university studies and employability; and innova-
tion; governance and resource management; univer-
sity mapping; and professorship and pedagogy.
The process culminated in the design of the “Stra-
tegic Plan for the Reform of Higher Education and 
Scientific Research” that will be presented to the 
public in December 2017 as part of the National 
Reform Conference sponsored by the prime minister. 
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While the plan proposes a series of measures aimed 
at transforming Tunisian higher education, it over-
emphasizes governance-related measures and falls 
short of addressing the centrality of students’ per-
sonal and professional growth. 
Pillar I: Research and Development and Innovation
With its 590 laboratories and research units, and 
1,803 researchers per one million inhabitants in 
2014, Tunisia ranks first in the Middle East and North 
Africa region in terms of research publications for 
the period 1996-2015. Established partnerships with 
European institutions – especially in the fields of 
food security, the environment, nanotechnology, and 
social sciences – exemplify this success. That said, 
the country has recently slipped in the Global Inno-
vation Index, ranking 77th out of 128 in 2016. Indeed, 
the country suffers from a low rate of patent filing 
and deficiencies in terms of transforming Research 
and Development (R&D) into entrepreneurial and 
commercially viable projects. A United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) sur-
vey of 22 stakeholders involved in entrepreneurship 
promotion showed that innovation is a key weakness 
of the Tunisian higher education system, as univer-
sity culture and teaching remains focused on theo-
retical training. The survey also demonstrated that 
the system excludes practical experience as well as 
connections with the country’s start-up ecosystem.
To further improve R&D at the university level, the 
MESRS aims to create project management units at 
various universities to help them deal with interna-
tional research programs. Additionally, it plans an 
overhaul of funding schemes to incorporate research 
tax-credits as part of Public-Private Partnerships to 
boost the involvement of private sector stakeholders 
in the research process. Moreover, to address poor 
performance in patent filing, universities will pro-
vide researchers with patent law courses and finance 
patent registration. Accordingly, the National Reform 
Commission believes that these measures, along 
with entrepreneurship modules, would lead to an 
improvement in the country’s innovation apparatus 
and create an “entrepreneurial university,” leading to 
the creation of new value-added enterprises and the 
expansion of already established enterprises.
The proposed reform plan does not, however, address 
the central role of undergraduate and postgraduate 
17  Benjamin Polle, “Tahar Ben Lakhdar: «Il est possible de mieux former les ingénieurs tunisiens, avec moins d’argent»,” Jeune Afrique, October 27, 2016 
<http://www.jeuneafrique.com/333377/economie/interview-tahar-ben-lakdar/> (accessed October 25, 2017).
students and, in its exclusive focus on researchers, 
fails to provide students with adequate and trans-
ferable research training. As such, in the absence of 
appropriate research education and practical exper-
tise in R&D, graduates – from engineers to those 
seeking research positions – will be unable to join 
high-end industries such as the technology sector. 
The case of the École Supérieure Privée d’Ingénierie 
et de Technologie (ESPRIT) can serve as a positive 
example that shows that innovative R&D initiatives 
and applied education are key to entrepreneurship, 
employability, and integration in the labor market. 
With a budget of 23.8 million Tunisian dinars,17 sig-
nificantly lower than the average public university’s 
budget, ESPRIT has been able to punch way above 
its weight. Based on the Conceive Design Implement 
Operate (CDIO) approach, the university adapted its 
pedagogy to involve students in the research pro-
cess and act as a pre-incubation program for future 
R&D-driven entrepreneurs. Indeed, this focus on 
applied research allowed for the commercialization 
of R&D outcomes. By giving them direct access to its 
research facilities, five start-ups have emerged out 
of ESPRIT’s academic environment, two of which are 
pursuing their development in Silicon Valley.
This was made possible by boosting study abroad 
opportunities and partnerships with companies and 
universities such as Paris-Dauphine, Mines-Telecom, 
Ginette, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy. Such partnerships and international accreditations 
provided its graduates visibility and credibility abroad, 
thereby opening doors and internationalizing univer-
sity life on campus. Additionally, ESPRIT’s reputation 
boosted the enrollment of sub-Saharan students as its 
curriculum became widely known across Africa. The 
same can be said beyond the entrepreneurship realm, 
as the university’s emphasis on a holistic rather than 
a theoretical curriculum has created classes of direct-
ly-operational engineers, 85 percent of whom find 
work after graduation, while the country’s overall grad-
uate employment rate remains as high as 26 percent.
Pillar II: Curriculum and Pedagogy
Since 2006, the higher education system has fol-
lowed the License-Master-Doctorate (LMD) model. 
Overall, curriculum development and content is 
characterized by standardization, and university cur-
ricula are reviewed and validated by sectorial minis-
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terial commissions dominated by professors. Private 
sector representatives are involved in the process 
when it comes to applied degrees and courses. Yet 
despite the involvements of such stakeholders, peda-
gogical tools remain archaic, and the most basic ser-
vices, such as electronic grading, remain unavailable. 
In terms of assessment, continuous evaluation is a 
fundamental principle of the system as students go 
through multiple examinations per semester. Such 
frequency has created a system in which students 
spend more time being assessed than they do learn-
ing. Beyond course content, the system suffers from 
a lack of transparency and accountability, as ineffec-
tive inspection mechanisms have led to a decline in 
teaching and administrative quality.
To address these shortcomings, the MESRS is work-
ing to restructure the LMD system to improve teach-
ing quality by reducing the number and frequency of 
examinations, setting up a system of auto-evaluation 
for professors, and providing universities with Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies (ICT) tools 
such as Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) for 
use in teaching. Taking into consideration the results 
achieved since the creation of the Virtual Univer-
sity of Tunis in 2002, the government believes it can 
build on this experience to generalize its success. 
The MESRS also plans to create language centers to 
improve students’ English as a second language, as 
part of an overarching soft skills approach.
While these measures would address some short-
comings of the Tunisian higher education system 
in terms of curriculum content and pedagogy, they 
are inadequate to deal with students’ personal and 
professional growth. This neglect of student quality 
learning is at the heart of the discrepancy between 
the skills they acquire and job market needs. Addi-
tionally, focusing on the current Tunisian context and 
ignoring wider global trends that will impact future 
graduates – such as the fourth industrial revolution 
– leads to an overarching failure to strategize holis-
tically, thereby widen ing the existing skills and job 
market gap. 
Pillar III: Campus Life and Student Experience
Despite its saliency for the overall university expe-
rience, and the well-being of students in particular, 
campus life is awarded very little importance in the 
Tunisian context. Almost no literature – either aca-
demic or non-academic – exists and no mention of 
18  Given the scarcity of written information, research was directed towards field research and media analysis. Visits were conducted to universities in the 
country’s capital, Tunis – where the bulk of Tunisian universities are based – and several podcasts on student life and campus environments were analyzed.
the matter is made in either the Strategic Plan or in 
public interviews conducted by senior ministry offi-
cials. The only noteworthy measure undertaken is a 
general increase in university infrastructure and the 
creation of new student resources, such as career 
centers and leadership centers.
Common shortcomings with regard to campus life in 
Tunisia include:18 
 - a lack of resources for disabled students and gen-
erally poor and old infrastructure, both those of 
the university premises as well as dorms, as well 
as a lack of interest in the green aspect of modern 
campuses; 
 - inadequate access to university and student infor-
mation online, where websites are not updated 
and student portals lack the most basic fea-
tures such as access to grades, course descrip-
tions, professor contacts and bios. This has led to 
 Kafkaesque situations in which students across 
the country spend hours on campus waiting for 
their grades to be posted on boards;
 - little or no access to basic facilities and resources, 
even at developed universities with sound infra-
structures, including computer labs with printers 
and other office supplies, libraries, and academic 
journals;
 - insufficient administrative resources, both in 
terms of HR and financial resources, which is 
especially problematic in the light of the system’s 
reliance on bureaucracy; and
 - a lack of university resources devoted to stu-
dent-run organizations, thereby hindering their 
sustainability.
The Institut des Hautes Études Commerciales de 
Carthage (IHEC Carthage) can serve as a posi-
tive example, which illustrates the importance and 
positive impact of creating a thriving campus life. 
Founded in 1942, IHEC Carthage is Tunisia’s primary 
public school. Despite its historic role in the coun-
try, students do not cite its curriculum as the most 
important factor in its successful graduate employ-
ment rate and their general fulfillment on campus, 
but emphasize the role of community life. 
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With around thirty student organizations19 organizing 
more than 200 events a year, the school boasts one 
of the most active campus lives in the country. These 
organizations have proven to be a core factor behind 
students’ success in terms of graduate employment 
and overall university experience. Beyond their par-
ticipation in conferences and events where network-
ing and capacity building are emphasized, their focus 
on student-led project management constitutes a 
primary source of practical knowledge. Indeed, stu-
dents are pushed to find financing, elaborate pro-
grams, and dive into the country’s business eco-sys-
tem. Students thereby acquire the practical skills and 
contacts which improve their labor market suitability 
and allow them to fully enjoy their time on campus as 
proactive individuals. In a country where over sev-
enty percent of universities have no active student 
organizations, IHEC Carthage represents a striking 
model to be followed and replicated. 
Recommendations
To address issues related to Pillar I – Research and 
Development and Innovation:
 - Beyond boosting existing R&D structures, the 
reform plan should also prioritize improving stu-
dents’ research skills, allowing them to gradu-
ate as fully-operational researchers on the labor 
market.20 R&D should be horizontal, rather than 
specific to PhDs and research institution staff. 
Undergraduate and graduate students should be 
encouraged, and sometimes even required, to 
take part in university research projects, both in 
elementary ways (working through manual pro-
cesses) and advanced ones (data-mining, coding, 
translation, report write-ups, laboratory testing, 
etc.). For instance, students should be allowed to 
obtain university credits as part of their univer-
sity research projects. This would also allow them 
to gain experience as research assistants, boost-
ing their credibility as researchers on the labor 
market. Specific research project-management 
training spanning all phases, including the search 
for funding, would enhance the benefits they will 
provide companies and organizations after grad-
uation. 
19  These organizations range from the university’s “Radio Libertad,” whose events have attracted nationwide coverage, to various entrepreneurship 
bodies – such as the Association Internationale des Etudiants en Eciences Economiques et Commerciales (AIESEC), ENACTUS (formally called Students in 
Free Enterprise (SIFE)), and Marketing Méditerranée Tunisie (MMT) – whose international networks and program depth allow students hands-on personal 
and professional development.
20  According to a 2014 study assessing the results of undergraduate research, student involvement in research greatly increased their intention to 
publish articles: Sharon A. Weiner and Charles Watkinson, “What do Students Learn from Participation in an Undergraduate Research Journal? Results of 
an Assessment,” Journal of Librarianship and Scholarly Communication 2 (2014), p.eP1125. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7710/2162-3309.1125> (accessed 
October 25, 2017).
 - To fulfill the innovative goal of R&D, students 
could initiate projects for which they would 
receive supervised access to resources at research 
institutes. Beyond the obvious benefits in terms 
of academic publishing, such access would also 
be advantageous to potential entrepreneurs in 
allowing for the initiation of commercialized R&D 
outcomes. As entrepreneurship modules remain 
theoretical, the establishment of private co-work-
ing spaces, accelerators, and incubators would 
complement the entrepreneurship centers. 
To address issues related to Pillar II – Curriculum 
and Pedagogy:
Based on international best practices and experi-
ences to tackle both the rigidity of the learning pro-
cess and the overall status-quo nature of the reform 
plan, structured flexibility should be the key philos-
ophy of the learning experience. Accordingly, the 
focus should be on access to interdepartmental and 
cross-disciplinary resources for students to acquire 
holistic knowledge and advance beyond specialized 
technical skills that limit their employability. 
 - Students should be allowed to cross-register, 
taking classes in different subjects and at differ-
ent departments despite majoring in one field of 
study. In addition, students should be allowed to 
choose specific elective classes within majors, in 
place of the established and standardized course-
work accompanied by an obligation to fulfill 
requirements.
 - Students should be required to fulfill holistic and 
multidisciplinary requirements, which should 
include the humanities, quantitative analysis, 
social sciences, and specific skills such as English 
as a second language.
 - Beyond the introduction of new subjects and pro-
grams, such as machine learning and artificial 
intelligence, existing curricula should be revised 
and redeveloped based on emerging international 
trends, such as the Curriculum in Open-access
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 Resources in Economics (CORE), emphasizing 
real-world problems.
Additionally, pedagogy should also focus on quality 
learning. In this sense, the use of new pedagogical 
tools should be encouraged. Professors should also 
be accountable to students and take greater care of 
their academic needs. 
 - Professors, PhD students, and teaching assistants 
should provide students with office hours. Excel-
lent undergraduate students can also gain expe-
rience by undertaking this task.
 - Tutorial centers and sessions for introductory 
mandatory courses by subject area should be 
provided (such as accounting, calculus, language, 
and essay writing centers). In addition, online 
course-specific platforms should be elaborated, 
with features including course readings, syllabi, 
videos and podcasts, forums, and notification 
panels.
 - Student evaluations of professors and course 
materials should be incorporated as part of the 
overall evaluation.
 - New methods of course examinations and student 
evaluations should be incorporated, such as par-
tial credit for essays as well as ICT-based quizzes.
To address issues related to Pillar III – Campus 
Life and Student Experience:
A shake-up of the existing approach should be under-
taken to focus on student well-being, and provide the 
student population with the adequate resources for 
it to thrive. This is especially true as many such ser-
vices are necessary and basic ones. They would con-
stitute important, quick gains. 
 - Study abroad, exchange opportunities, and aca-
demic programs should be boosted to interna-
tionalize university life on campus. Existing part-
nerships and programs as well as scholarships 
and fellowships offered by a significant number of 
international institutions need to be better pub-
licized.
 - Centers dedicated for alumni relations, health and 
counseling services, as well as student housing 
and dining services should be created.
 - First-year students should be prepared for uni-
versity life by holding orientation weeks, during 
which students would receive extensive aca-
demic advice (including degree requirements 
and schedule planning), become acquainted with 
the academic curriculum and undergraduate 
research, explore ways to get involved in campus 
activities, meet faculty and staff, and learn about 
campus life and environment from current and 
former students.
 - University communication strategies and plans 
need to be established to attract foreign stu-
dents as part of exchange programs and boost the 
image of universities abroad, especially online, 
and to promote universities’ credibility as well as 
that of students after graduation.
 - Provide students with part-time employment 
opportunities at the university and through 
university-affiliated partners. Such affiliations 
require a negotiated flexibility of working hours, 
which allow for a work-life-study balance for stu-
dents.
 - Reinforce the post-revolution momentum of 
active student-run organizations by providing 
them with university resources as well as finan-
cial aid based on their impact.
 - Boost intra-university and inter-university ath-
letic and artistic activities to create an established 
extracurricular environment in which university 
branding leads to the creation of a distinctive uni-
versity culture.
 - For all IT and non-IT related matters, assign stu-
dents specific online identities (such as emails 
and unique names) for communication purposes, 
the ability to log in to all available resources, and 
further to monitor student numbers for admin-
istrative purposes and tracking. All administra-
tive tasks should be undertaken online. Given the 
experience and historic commitment in Tunisia of 
technology giants such as Microsoft and ICT for 
Education, these could be ideal partners for the 
e-admin transformation.
 - Improve library facilities and allow students 
access to all available resources such as course 
textbooks (for those unable to purchase them), 
online academic journals, IT equipment (comput-
ers with appropriate software and applications 
including Stata, R, Bloomberg, and other pack-
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ages needed for practical learning, as well as mul-
tiple printers and scanners). Such improvements 
would also involve library services providing 24/7 
opening hours during peak exam times, and ded-
icated and trained library staff.
Molka Abassi is a consultant at McKinsey & 
Company in Dubai. At the time of the workshop, 
she worked as a consultant at the International 
Labour Organization’s Conditions of Work and 
Equality Department in Geneva, Switzerland.
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